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HUSHING CONTRACTS 
DAVID A. HOFFMAN & ERIK LAMPMANN* 
ABSTRACT 
The last few years have brought a renewed appreciation of the costs of 
nondisclosure agreements that suppress information about sexual 
wrongdoing. Recently passed bills in a number of states, including New 
York and California, have attempted to deal with such hush contracts. But 
such legislation is often incomplete, and many courts and commentators 
continue to ask if victims of harassment can sign enforceable settlements 
that conceal serious, potentially metastasizing, social harms. In this Article, 
we argue that employing the public policy doctrine, courts ought to 
generally refuse to enforce hush agreements, especially those created by 
organizations. We restate public policy as a defense which should be 
concerned with managing externalities, and which expresses a legitimating 
account of contract law. 
  
 
* Hoffman is a Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School, where Lampmann 
will graduate in 2020. For comments on earlier drafts, we thank Adam Badawi, Jean Galbraith, Leora 
Eisenstadt, Serena Mayeri, Brishen Rogers and Tess Wilkinson-Ryan. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Contracts are making news. 
In December 2016, McKayla Maroney, a gold medal winning American 
gymnast, agreed to settle her lawsuit against USA Gymnastics (USAG) for 
enabling Dr. Larry Nassar to abuse her. In the settlement agreement, 
Maroney promised to either refrain from further speech about her ordeal or 
pay a $125,000 liquidated damages fee,1 together with the costs and fees of 
enforcement.2 Revelation of this stipulation created a national furor,3 and 
USAG ultimately abandoned it.4 
 
1. Victor Mather, McKayla Maroney Says USA Gymnastics Forced Confidentiality in Sexual 
Abuse Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/sports/olympics/ 
mckayla-maroney-usa-gymnastics-confidentiality-agreement.html [https://perma.cc/H8S3-498Y]. 
2. Complaint for Damages at 56, Maroney v. Mich. State Univ., No. BC-687396 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. Dec. 20, 2017) [hereinafter Maroney Complaint]. 
3. Scott Gleeson, Chrissy Teigen Offers to Pay $100,000 Fine for McKayla Maroney to Speak 
Out Against Nassar, USA TODAY (Jan. 16, 2018, 4:01 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/oly 
mpics/2018/01/16/chrissy-teigen-offers-pay-100000-fine-mckayla-maroney-larry-nassar/1036339001/ 
[https://perma.cc/C93D-Y7VZ]. 
4. Heather Tucker, USA Gymnastics Says It Will Not Fine McKayla Maroney if She Speaks Out 
Against Larry Nassar, USA TODAY (Jan. 16, 2018, 10:40 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ 
olympics/2018/01/16/usa-gymnastics-mckayla-maroney-larry-nassar/1039025001/ [https://perma.cc/5 
CGW-28QA]. 
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In October 2017, Zelda Perkins, the longtime assistant to Miramax’s 
Harvey Weinstein, broke a nineteen-year-old agreement in which she 
agreed not to reveal that the mogul had harassed her in return for £250,000.5 
Perkins’s breach of contract sparked a swell of stories by other victims of 
Weinstein, and, along with his resignation and the firm’s bankruptcy, 
intensified the burgeoning #MeToo movement. 
Finally (and you knew this was coming), on October 28, 2016, ten days 
before the Presidential election, Michael Cohen executed an agreement with 
Stephanie Clifford, in which Clifford agreed to keep silent about an alleged 
affair with Cohen’s client, Donald Trump, as well as return evidence of the 
relationship, in return for a sum of $130,000.6 Clifford’s 2018 suit to render 
the agreement unenforceable ignited a political and legal battle that 
encompassed the Special Counsel’s office, guilty pleas for criminal 
violations of campaign finance laws,7 and weighty matters of Presidential 
immunity.8 
These agreements concern underlying behavior with sundry culpabilities 
and quell disclosure with a variety of contractual spurs. As a threshold 
matter, they deal with different sorts of behavior––from a consensual affair 
involving the President to criminal sexual assault. But, notwithstanding the 
obvious differences, each, when revealed, engendered a similar public 
response: disgust. Indeed, our present moment of reconceiving and coming 
to terms with sexist and sex-based misconduct, organized around #MeToo, 
is driven largely by a reaction to wrongdoing buried by contract, and 
revealed by its breach. Public disclosures of contractual secrets are giving 
breach a good name. 
This Article considers the emerging political and legal movement 
surrounding hush contracts—which we define as nondisclosure agreements 
covering sexual misconduct.9 We use the term “sexual misconduct” 
 
 5. Matthew Garrahan, Harvey Weinstein: How Lawyers Kept a Lid on Sexual Harassment 
Claims, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/1dc8a8ae-b7e0-11e7-8c12-5661783e5 
589 [https://perma.cc/S3ZW-KXLZ]. 
6. Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 4, Clifford v. Trump, No. BC-696568 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Mar. 6, 2018), http://documents.latimes.com/stormy-daniels-donald-trump-complaint/ [https://perma.cc 
/ZA5M-NZWA] [hereinafter Clifford Complaint]. 
7. Plea Agreement, United States v. Cohen, No. 1:18-cr-00850-WHP (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2018), 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/5331554/Michael-Cohen-plea-agreement-from-the-Speci 
al.pdf [https://perma.cc/T857-V9RW]. 
8. Clifford Complaint, supra note 6, at 2. 
9. The parlance of “hush” or “hushing” contracts extends back to at least 1995, and continues 
to surface in popular press articles concerning settlement agreements which contain nondisclosure and 
confidentiality provisions. See, e.g., Sharon Walsh, Hushing Up Harassment?, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 
1995), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1995/04/09/hushing-up-harassment/184827a 
f-21de-49ad-9cb0-b94917ef5592/ [https://perma.cc/7Q64-749R]; see also Eliza Dushku, Eliza Dushku: 
I Worked at CBS. I Didn’t Want to be Sexually Harassed. I Was Fired., BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 19, 2018), 
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deliberately to refer to the widest possible category of wrongdoing of a 
sexualized or sex-based nature.10 In so doing, we thread the needle between 
employment discrimination scholars’ power-based account of sexual 
harassment (which considers “harassment as an expression of workplace 
sexism, not sexuality or sexual desire”)11 and the commonplace use of 
sexual harassment to refer only to sexual advances motivated by desire.12 
We focus on those instances where parties contract to conceal misconduct 
of a sexual nature whose nondisclosure carries a steep cost to the public.  
The moment is ripe for such a treatment, as hush contracts are 
increasingly the subject of legislative action. In one recent, and salient, 
example, in its 2018 budget, New York State passed a law that Governor 
Cuomo bragged would “end the secrecy and coercive practices that have 
enabled [sexual] harassment for far too long.”13  
Upon closer inspection, New York’s bill (like many recently passed or 
considered laws across a variety of jurisdictions) is a virtual husk.14 The key 
language permits a hush contract if it is the “complainant’s preference,” 
defined as the victim agreeing to the wrongdoer’s proposal after a twenty-
one day waiting period.15 Or, to put it differently, New York State prohibits 
only those hush contracts that lack mutual assent. Nondisclosure about 
 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2018/12/19/eliza-dushku-responds-what-happened-cbs-took-jo 
b-and-because-objected-being-sexually-harassed-was-fired/OCh7h0pwg4Aq7xfwOUasyO/story.html 
[https://perma.cc/EQ3R-EQWF]. For our purposes, “hush contracts” include both those agreements 
concealing potentially unlawful sexual misconduct and consensual sexual acts found objectionable for 
other reasons, see, e.g., infra Part IV.B (applying our framework to President Trump’s dealings with 
Ms. Clifford).  
10. For us, “sexual misconduct” therefore encompasses behaviors ranging from sexual assault to 
verbal harassment unrelated to the offender’s sexual desires, see infra notes 86–89. 
11. Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, 128 YALE L.J.F. 22, 24 (2018), 
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/reconceptualizing-sexual-harassment-again [https://perma.cc/W 
4FG-EWMG]; see also Vicki Schultz, Essay, Open Statement on Sexual Harassment from Employment 
Discrimination Law Scholars, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 17 (2018), https://www.stanfordlawreview.or 
g/online/open-statement-on-sexual-harassment-from-employment-discrimination-law-scholars/ [https:/ 
/perma.cc/DH55-D6TQ]. By defining the scope of our inquiry into hush contracts in terms of sexual 
misconduct, we attempt to sweep in the widest possible variety of sex-based or sexual behavior hushed 
by contractual agreement.  
12. See, e.g., Sexual Harassment, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003) 
(“[U]ninvited and unwelcome verbal or physical behavior of a sexual nature especially by a person in 
authority toward a subordinate (such as an employee or student).”).  
13. David Klepper, Cuomo to Push for Legislation to Combat Sexual Harassment, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/438907e689ba483a93bfb63099451990 [https://perma.c 
c/5DJM-UMYJ]. 
14. 2018 N.Y. Sess. Laws Ch. 57, pt. KK, subpt. D, § 1 (McKinney) (codified at N.Y. GEN. 
OBLIG. LAW § 5-336 (McKinney 2018)); see also infra Part I.B for a discussion of these state laws and 
exceptions. 
15. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-336 (McKinney 2018).  
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sexual wrongdoing may be politically disfavored, but lawmakers have been 
largely unwilling to make such contracts categorically unenforceable.16  
Why are hush contracts so hard to kill? The most flattering accounts posit 
that nondisclosure agreements (NDA) are necessary for corrective justice.17 
As the argument goes, settlement often can occur only if the parties agree 
to hold its terms (and very existence) silent.18 Because compromise can be 
the only practical recourse for private parties, making nondisclosure clauses 
enforceable may be necessary to remedy harms.19 
In this Article, we argue that even those who are attracted by utilitarian 
accounts of contract law ought to reject this defense of hush contracts.20 
After collecting information from a variety of sources and disciplines, we 
argue that not only do hush contracts encourage specific acts of repeated 
(and spiraling) misconduct,21 but also they can corrupt entire organizations 
and communities.22 As a recent exposé put it, “[l]ike a stealthy virus, sexual 
harassment impacts the wellbeing of society at every level.”23 
Consequently, we conclude that even when the parties consent at arms-
 
16. We will discuss the key counterexample, California, infra notes 138–142.  
17. See generally Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan, Semi-Confidential Settlements in Civil, 
Criminal, and Sexual Assault Cases, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 311, 314 (2018) (recommending that the 
fact of settlement, but not the amount, might in extraordinary circumstances be kept public); see also 
Ian Ayres, Targeting Repeat Offender NDAs, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 76 (2018) (arguing NDAs 
should be enforceable only if they meet certain formalities). 
18. For example, Debra Katz, a plaintiff’s attorney, argues that confidentiality is necessary to 
settlement agreements because plaintiffs “want their privacy protected and if they feel like they can’t 
end these situations with a private resolution, they’re not going to come forward.” Stephanie Russell-
Kraft, How to End the Silence Around Sexual-Harassment Settlements, NATION (Jan. 12, 2018), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/how-to-end-the-silence-around-sexual-harassment-settlements/ [http 
s://perma.cc/6BUH-Q4D7] 
19. See Ayres, supra note 17. Ayres’s proposal takes on the “difficult task of proposing an 
intermediate reform” to protect what he sees as the legitimate “survivor privacy” and “false accusation” 
interests in enforcing NDAs. Id. at 77–78. We take on those objections below. 
20. For previous work, see Levmore & Fagan, supra note 17; Orly Lobel, NDAs Are Out of 
Control. Here’s What Needs to Change, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/01/ndas-
are-out-of-control-heres-what-needs-to-change [https://perma.cc/LJ96-HVTY]. See also Ayres, supra 
note 17. For a consideration of the corporate law implications of nondisclosure clauses, see Daniel 
Hemel & Dorothy S. Lund, Sexual Harassment and Corporate Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1583 (2018). 
21. See Jana Costas & Christopher Grey, Bringing Secrecy into the Open: Towards a 
Theorization of the Social Processes of Organizational Secrecy, 35 ORG. STUD. 1423 (2014) 
(emphasizing the ways that organizational secrecy is less an official policy and more a combination of 
formal and informal social processes). 
22. See Blake E. Ashforth & Vikas Anand, The Normalization of Corruption in Organizations, 
25 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 1, 3 (2003) (describing the process by which wrongdoing by 
individual actors becomes endemic within an organization through institutionalization, rationalization, 
and socialization). 
23.  Lynn Parramore, $MeToo: The Economic Cost of Sexual Harassment (Inst. for New Econ. 
Thinking, Conference Paper, 2018), https://www.ineteconomics.org/research/research-papers/metoo-
the-economic-cost-of-sexual-harassment [https://perma.cc/G24J-7APG].  
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length and after due reflection to a hush contract, courts should be very 
hesitant to enforce this contract. 
Our chosen doctrinal hook—increasingly employed by lawyers in hush 
contract cases24—is the oft-criticized doctrine of contractual public policy. 
Like other writers––including one in these pages,25 we give that doctrine 
content by focusing on third-party harm.26 That is, rather than ask if the 
parties to a contract really consented to it—an inquiry invited by various 
legislatures’ procedural approaches—we would judge such contracts by 
their negative externalities.  
Grounding public policy in public harms advances two important goals. 
First, it provides contract law a way to infuse public values, and concerns, 
into private agreements whose cost and benefits aren’t easily cabined. In an 
era when contract cases increasingly vanish into secret arbitral tribunals,27 
and where digital consent is notional, courts ought to seize the limited 
opportunities available to demonstrate that the state’s enforcement powers 
can serve ends that ultimately maximize the public’s welfare, rather than 
maximizing the goals of parties entering into private agreements which 
might harm third parties. Moreover, because public policy defenses rely on 
the factually intense and inherently conservative common law for their 
articulation, public policy doctrine is self-limiting. That is: unlike 
legislation, if we are wrong about the balance of costs and benefits hush 
contracts create, courts will reverse course, and with less difficulty than 
gridlocked legislatures. 
Second, in quieting hush contracts, we seek to revitalize contract doctrine 
more broadly. The practice of contracting, and the resolution of claims both 
 
24. See, e.g., Maroney Complaint, supra note 2, at 27, ¶72. 
25. See Nancy Leong, Them Too, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1 (2019) (cataloguing forms of third-
party harms implicated in many forms of consensual and non-consensual sexual behavior).  
26. We are not the first to suggest that public policy is intertwined with externalities, though we 
do take the account further than it’s been, particularly with respect to remedies, and importantly, 
expressive effects. The others we have drawn on in crafting our argument include FARSHAD GHODOOSI, 
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION (2017); Adam B. Badawi, 
Harm, Ambiguity, and the Regulation of Illegal Contracts, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 483 (2010); Aditi 
Bagchi, Other People’s Contracts, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 211, 243 (2015); Carol M. Bast, At What Price 
Silence: Are Confidentiality Agreements Enforceable?, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 627, 670–72 (1999) 
(arguing for whistleblower protection in the case of public hazards); F. H. Buckley, Perfectionism, 13 
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 133, 143 (2005); Juliet P. Kostritsky, Illegal Contracts and Efficient Deterrence: 
A Study in Modern Contract Theory, 74 IOWA L. REV. 115 (1988); Note, A Law and Economics Look at 
Contracts Against Public Policy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1445 (2006) [hereinafter Law and Economics]; 
Ryan M. Philp, Comment, Silence at Our Expense: Balancing Safety and Secrecy in Non-Disclosure 
Agreements, 33 SETON HALL. L. REV. 845 (2003) (arguing that courts should refuse to enforce NDAs 
that threaten the public welfare); James E. Rooks, Jr., Let the Sun Shine In, TRIAL, June 2003, at 18. 
27. Samuel Issacharoff & Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, The Hollowed Out Common Law (N.Y. 
Univ. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 18-33, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3261372 [https://perma.cc/Y54Z-WVE9]. 
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in court and in arbitration is increasingly a sterile exercise—a joke about 
“clicking to agree” whose punchline is rote enforcement. We think this trend 
is pernicious: it threatens to rob contracting of the moral force that it needs 
to achieve efficacy and legitimacy in a world where almost no contracts are 
read, breached, or sued upon.28 Courts should push back by seizing on 
particularly high-profile examples where enforcement of contracts violates 
ordinary intuitions of fairness and distributive justice. Hush contracts are a 
good place to start that project of resistance. By refusing to enforce such 
agreements, courts will give an expressive voice to contract law that it is 
currently missing. 
We proceed as follows. Part I reviews the private benefits and public 
costs of hush contracts. Part II describes the existing state of public policy 
doctrine on NDAs. Part III argues for a reimagining of public policy as an 
engine to reduce external harm. Part IV reveals the need for an expressive 
account of contract law and ties that account to public policy. 
I. THE PUBLIC COSTS AND PRIVATE BENEFITS OF SECRECY ABOUT 
SEXUAL WRONGDOING 
“With sexual-abuse scandals bubbling out of Hollywood, Capitol Hill, 
and corporate boardrooms nationwide, you might wonder why the accusers 
kept their suffering a secret for years, before realizing in recent weeks that 
they weren’t alone. There’s more than fear behind their silence: Their lips 
were sealed with a signature.”29 
 
The antisocial consequences of private civil settlements are a well-trod 
subject.30 Indeed, there have been repeated cycles of public concern with, 
and reaction to, secrecy about litigation.31 The patterns are illustrative of 
where the hush contract movement may be going. In the last decades, fights 
against secrecy about automobile manufacturing defects32 and molestation 
 
28. David A. Hoffman, Relational Contracts of Adhesion, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1395, 1409–10 
(2018); David A. Hoffman & Zev J. Eigen, Contract Consideration and Behavior, 85 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 351, 396 (2017). 
29. Michelle Chen, How Forced Arbitration and Non-Disclosure Agreements Can Perpetuate 
Hostile Work Environments, NATION (Nov. 30, 2017) https://www.thenation.com/article/how-forced-
arbitration-and-non-disclosure-agreements-can-perpetuate-hostile-work-environments [https://perma.c 
c/6XWU-72N6]. 
30. Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076 (1984); David Luban, 
Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2621 (1995). 
31. For a lucid discussion, see Elizabeth Wilkins, Silent Workers, Disappearing Rights: 
Confidential Settlements and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 34 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 109, 122–
24 (2013). 
32. Elizabeth E. Spainhour, Recent Development, Unsealing Settlements: Recent Efforts to 
Expose Settlement Agreements that Conceal Public Hazards, 82 N.C. L. REV. 2155, 2172 (2004). The 
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by priests33 built on powerful personal narratives to generate public pressure 
against secrecy.34 Victims organized—helped along by the trial bar35—to 
increase public scrutiny of private practices, and ultimately successfully 
generated pressure for law reform.36 
Increasingly, advocates are beginning to conceptualize efforts to regulate 
or eliminate hush contracts in similar ways, arguing that individuals’ lives 
and well-being are threatened every time a perpetrator of sexual misconduct 
is allowed to retain his or her privacy at the expense of a far more numerous 
pool of potential future victims.37 Empirical studies of the incidence of 
sexual harassment support these advocates’ decision to sound the alarm. 
A survey conducted in 2017 by Business Insider and MSN revealed that 
“45% of women polled . . . have been sexually harassed at work. This 
translates to about 33.6 million women in the US.”38 An exhaustive review 
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of attempts to 
quantify the occurrence of sexual harassment led its commissioners to report 
 
Post’s series of articles surrounding these efforts led to two reporters being named finalists for the 1989 
Pulitzer Prize for Investigative Reporting. See, e.g., Elsa Walsh & Benjamin Weiser, Court Secrecy 
Masks Safety Issues, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 1988) https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
archive/politics/1988/10/23/court-secrecy-masks-safety-issues/09db3810-feb8-4d5e-8d97-69871e3844 
75/ [https://perma.cc/4AR2-X6VS]; see also Ashley Gauthier, Secret Justice: Alternative Dispute 
Resulotion, Secret Settlements in Hazardous Cases, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS  
(Fall 2001), https://www.rcfp.org/w p-content/uploads/imported/SJADR.pdf [https://perma.cc/N99C-G 
RVX].  
33. Confronted with organized breaches of confidentiality provisions, the Church decided to 
largely refrain from suing to enforce liquidated damages provisions in order to save whatever face they 
could. See Adam Liptak, Price of Broken Vows of Silence, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2002), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/26/us/price-of-broken-vows-of-silence.html [https://perma.cc/F483-
PJDT]; see also Christopher R. Drahozal & Laura J. Hines, Secret Settlement Restrictions and 
Unintended Consequences, 54 KAN. L. REV. 1457 (2006); Philp, supra note 26, at 880 (explaining ways 
the Catholic Church sex abuse scandal brought confidential settlement agreements into the limelight). 
34. Barry Siegel, Dilemmas of Settling in Secret: Companies Offer Hefty Sums in Exchange for 
Keeping the Details of Public-Hazard Lawsuits Quiet. Plaintiffs Must Choose Their Own Interest or the 
Public Good, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 5, 1991), http://articles.latimes.com/1991-04-05/news/mn-1990_1_publ 
ic-interest [https://perma.cc/759F-WJDP] (“Today, I regret that deal . . . . There are things that you all 
should know. I can’t say some things. And those things could save lots of lives . . . . Lives would be 
saved if people knew.”). 
35. Notably, American Association of Trial Attorneys, now known as the American Association 
for Justice (AAJ), played an integral role in this fight. See Court Secrecy, AM. ASS’N FOR JUST., 
https://www.justice.org/what-we-do/advocate-civil-justice-system/issue-advocacy/court-secrecy [https: 
//perma.cc/TJ8W-HAE4]. 
36. See Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Secrecy in the Courts: At the Tipping Point, 53 VILL. L. REV. 
811, 815 (2008) (providing one example of a motivated lawyer pressuring elected officials to reign in 
the scope of confidential settlements through legislative action). 
37. Work in this vein is of course not new, though the #MeToo movement has revitalized it. See, 
e.g., Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 927, 929 (2006). 
38. Rachel Gillett, Sexual Harassment Isn’t a Hollywood, Tech, or Media Issue—It Affects 
Everyone, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 30, 2017, 10:49 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/sexual-harassmen 
t-affects-n early-everyone-2017-11 [https://perma.cc/L5TV-JV44].  
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even higher numbers.39 In a 2016 report, the EEOC concluded that “60% to 
70% of women have been on the receiving end of sexual harassment on the 
job at some point during their careers.”40 
Worse, most individuals who experience harassment never take steps to 
report the misconduct. According to a report by EEOC Commissioner Chai 
Feldblum and acting EEOC Chair Victoria A. Lipnic, a full “85% of 
employees who experience harassment don’t bring charges to [the 
Commission], and up to 70% never complain internally to their 
employers.”41 The EEOC explains that “[e]mployees who experience 
harassment [often] fail to report the harassing behavior or to file a complaint 
because they fear disbelief of their claim, inaction on their claim, blame, or 
social or professional retaliation.”42  
But notwithstanding these sobering statistics about the prevalence of 
harassment, scholars, advocates, attorneys, and even survivors themselves 
are divided on whether hush contracts ought to be permitted and, if so, to 
what extent.43 Hush contracts covering sexual wrongdoing do benefit both 
parties involved in settlements. But, as Jodi Short has observed, 
“[H]arassment has been seen as harming an individual . . . . The challenge 
for advocates . . . will be stressing that the harm is more widespread,” ideally 
 
39. We borrow from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s definition of sexual 
harassment as “unwelcome or offensive conduct based on a protected characteristic under employment 
anti-discrimination law.” U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, REPORT OF THE CO-CHAIRS OF THE 
SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 3 (2016), https://www.eeoc.g 
ov/eeoc/task_force/harassment/upload/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6L5-CNVV] [hereinafter EEOC, 
TASK FORCE].  
40. Chai R. Feldblum & Victoria A. Lipnic, Breaking the Silence, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 26, 
2018), https://hbr.org/2018/01/breaking-the-silence [https://perma.cc/87P7-TV4N] (describing the 
relevancy of the EEOC’s 2016 report to the debate on sexual harassment spurred by the #MeToo 
movement). Too often, the image we have of the women subjected to workplace sexual misconduct are 
affluent professionals. But blue-collar and working-class women have been equally vocal about their 
mistreatment even as they have lent their support to women with high-profile stories of harassment and 
abuse. See, e.g., Susan Chira, We Asked Women in Blue-Collar Workplaces About Harassment. Here 
are Their Stories, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/29/us/blue-collar-
women-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/U26M-UNX7]; see also 700,000 Female Farmworkers Say 
They Stand with Hollywood Actors Against Sexual Assault, TIME (Nov. 10, 2017), http://time.com/50188 
13/farmworkers-solidarity-hollywood-sexual-assault/ [https://perma.cc/4UL6-ED8W]. A similar story 
can be easily told about race and the dimensions of social bias. In fact, “[p]eople on the margins––
women of color, poor women, undocumented women, and trans men and women––are uniquely 
impacted by sexual assault and harassment” and subjected to sexual misconduct at disproportionately 
high rates. Collier Meyerson, Sexual Assault When You’re on the Margins: Can We All Say #MeToo?, 
NATION (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/sexual-assault-when-youre-on-the-mar 
gins-can-we-all-say-metoo/ [https://perma.cc/2LX3-DNW3]; see also Sarah Childress, Undocumented 
Sexual Assault Victims Face Backlash and Backlog, PBS (June 23, 2015), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/fro 
ntline/article/undocumented-sexual-assault-victims-face-backlash-and-backlog/ [https://perma.cc/7KG 
L-2KS9]. 
41. Feldblum & Lipnic, supra note 40. 
42. EEOC, TASK FORCE, supra note 39, at v. 
43. See Parramore, supra note 23; cf. Russell-Kraft, supra note 18. 
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through the use of empirical evidence to demonstrate that the problem is not 
isolated.44 In the rest of this Part, we inventory and address scholarship from 
different ideological perspectives and disciplines that grapple with the 
effects of hush contracts on both the parties to the agreement as well as the 
general public.45  
A. The Costs of Hush Contracts 
In this section, we describe the social costs of hush contracts. While the 
benefits to survivors of sexual harassment of being paid are obvious—
though not so obvious for us to avoid dilating on this topic in a few pages—
the costs are diffuse and less well studied.46 We begin with costs rather than 
benefits because our position faces the normal obstacles put to any proposed 
doctrinal change (why now? why courts?), as well as the familiar 
convention that private parties should be left to their own contracting 
devices. We aim for the reader to leave this section convinced that there are 
social costs to hush contracts that are more significant than they previously 
appreciated. 
Let’s start with the manifest. When a firm pays a survivor to remain silent 
about past abuse, it is more likely to leave in place abusers and the culture 
that enables them.47 The result is to increase the incidence of and harm 
caused by sexual harassment. It does so directly: when firms hide 
information about wrongdoing, they can avoid reputational harm for 
retaining abusers in their positions. It also does so indirectly: organizational 
cultures that pay off survivors of harassment are ones where, over time, 
women feel themselves unwelcome. 
Stating these propositions is easier than proving them. We do not have a 
counterfactual firmly in hand. That is, to know what hush contracts do to 
the incidence of sexual harassment, the gold standard test would be to find 
 
44. Nitasha Tiku, How to Pierce the Secrecy Around Sexual Harassment Cases, WIRED (Dec. 4, 
2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/how-to-pierce-the-secrecy-around-sexual-harassment-
cases/ [https ://perma.cc/8S5V-PMBK]. 
45. For an extended discussion of the ethical implications for lawyers drafting such contracts, 
see generally Stephen Gillers, Speak No Evil: Settlement Agreements Conditioned on Noncooperation 
Are Illegal and Unethical, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 22 (2002), arguing that lawyers who draft 
noncooperation clauses for settlement agreements are breaking federal law by obstructing justice and 
likely violating their ethical obligations as officers of the court. See also Jon Bauer, Buying Witness 
Silence: Evidence-Suppressing Settlements and Lawyers’ Ethics, 87 OR. L. REV. 481 (2008). 
46. Lizzie O’Leary & Peter Balonon-Rosen, How Women Pay an Economic Price After Sexual 
Harassment, MARKETPLACE (Nov. 3, 2017, 1:55PM), https://www.marketplace.org/2017/11/03/busine 
ss/how-women-pay-economic-price-after-sexual-harassment [https://perma.cc/DC2J-QPUV]. 
47. Please note we focus here on hush contracts entered into by firms either on their own behalf 
or on the behalf of members of their leadership team. Since our framework does not distinguish between 
these two paths towards hush agreements, we do not linger on it. 
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a legal regime that switched from enforcement to nonenforcement of hush 
contracts, and a measure of harassment, and attempt to correlate the two. To 
date, such a natural experiment has been unavailable.48 Alternatively, we 
might want to look at workplaces where hush contracts are more difficult to 
enforce (such as the federal government) and gather information about how 
employees learn about bad acts and worse co-workers.49 
In the absence of that kind of evidence, any accounts are necessarily 
anecdotal. Consider, in this light, the claims by Gretchen Carlson, herself 
party to a hush contract, who expressed a concern shared by many critics of 
these agreements, telling Wired that they “both silence the victims and fool 
our culture into thinking we’ve come so far when we have not.”50 She 
continued that “[these agreements are] a way for companies to cover all of 
their dirty laundry before it happens.”51  
Maureen Ryan’s story is similar.52 A widely published television critic, 
Ryan was in her forties in 2014 when she was sexually assaulted by a TV 
executive, with whom she later entered into a hush contract.53 She broke her 
silence in 2017 in a personal essay published in Variety after hearing rumors 
that her attacker had begun preying on young assistants.54 Ryan took aim at 
the “culture of complicity” reinforced by hush contracts and urged survivors 
to come out of the shadows in order to protect colleagues,55 explaining that 
 
48. With the recent enactment of a California state law regulating hush contracts, we may see 
empirical evidence in the next couple years. See infra notes 138–140. 
49. Historically, courts have permitted state actors to negotiate for non-disparagement and 
nondisclosure clauses when the information at stake is critically important for the public good. See Am. 
Foreign Serv. Ass’n v. Garfinkel, 490 U.S. 153 (1989) (per curiam) (allowing the government to protect 
classified information through contractual relationships with federal employees privy to sensitive 
matters). Scholarly debate concerning whether or not government actors should be able to enforce 
nondisclosure and/or non-disparagement clauses against individuals continues, though. See, e.g., Eugene 
Volokh, Settlement Deal: Former VA Employee May Not Make ‘Negative Comments to Any Member of 
Congress . . . or Any Newspapers’, WASH. POST (Apr. 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/new 
s/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/04/27/settlement-deal-former-va-employee-may-not-make-negative-co 
mments-to-any-member-of-congress-or-any-newspapers/ [https://perma.cc/3AHM-SHKE] (discussing 
whether political accountability ought to weigh against such enforcement). 
50. Tiku, supra note 44. 
51. Tiku, supra note 44; see also Ronan Farrow, Les Moonves and CBS Face Allegations of 
Sexual Misconduct, NEW YORKER (July 27, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/08/ 
06/les-moonves-and-cbs-face-allegations-of-sexual-misconduct [https://perma.cc/6SK4-H3WW] 
(describing a variety of allegations made against CBS chief Les Moonves, who several women 
characterized as creating and sustaining culture of permissiveness towards sexual harassment from the 
top, which corrupted the whole organization). 
52. Maureen Ryan, A TV Executive Sexually Assaulted Me: A Critic’s Personal Story, VARIETY 
(Oct. 18, 2017, 6:30 AM), https://variety.com/2017/tv/columns/harvey-weinstein-sexual-assault-me-too 
-television-hollywood-1202591406/ [https://perma.cc/ALS9-4HNX]. 
53. Id.  
54. Id.  
55. Id. (“If you don’t prioritize the health and safety of survivors over the futures of those who 
repeatedly hurt others, all your posturing on social media won’t help you.”). 
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“[i]f you have credible reports of abuse, harassment or assault, that man has 
already damaged many careers.”56 The problem, according to Ryan, was not 
just with high-profile abusers like Harvey Weinstein but with similarly 
predatory figures across the industry, leading her to conclude, “Harvey is 
not the whole story. There are many Harveys, with varying amounts of 
influence . . . . [a]nd at every level, formally and informally, they are 
covered for.”57 
Actress Eliza Dushku tells another story of hush contracts insulating 
attackers from accountability.58 Dushku alleged that CBS actor Michael 
Weatherly made inappropriate comments and threats while they were 
jointly employed on a television show, some of which were captured on 
camera, that led her to feel “disgusting and violated.”59 Shortly after she 
confronted him, her role was written off of the show.60 She eventually 
settled with CBS after coming forward, signing a hush contract instead of 
pursuing what she imagined would be several years of confidential 
arbitration.61 As part of her settlement, she insisted “that CBS designate an 
individual trained in sexual harassment compliance to monitor Weatherly 
and the show in general.”62 The real extent of workplace harassment at CBS 
only became clear in August 2018, when outside law firms investigated 
misconduct allegations against then-CEO Les Moonves. The firms 
eventually issued a report stating that the network’s “handling of Ms. 
Dushku’s complaints was not only misguided, but emblematic of larger 
problems at CBS.”63 The report continued, explaining that “[w]hen faced 
with instances of wrongdoing, the company had a tendency to protect itself, 
at the expense of victims.”64 
Finally, investigative journalists in 2017 revealed that Fox News had 
entered into at least five hush contracts, worth more than $13 million, with 
individuals who came forward alleging sexual misconduct by TV pundit 
Bill O’Reilly.65 Journalists covering the settlements described the reports as 
 
56. Id. (emphasis removed).  
57. Id.  
58. Dushku, supra note 9. 
59. Rachel Abrams & John Koblin, CBS Paid the Actress Eliza Dushku $9.5 Million to Settle 
Harassment Claims, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/13/business/media 
/cbs-bull-weatherly-dushku-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/R6PY-AW75]. 
60. Id.  
61. Dushku, supra note 9. 
62. Id. 
63. Abrams & Koblin, supra note 59. 
64. Id. 
65. Emily Steel & Michael S. Schmidt, Bill O’Reilly Thrives at Fox News, Even as Harassment 
Settlements Add Up, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/01/business/media/ 
bill-oreilly-sexual-harassment-fox-news.html [https://perma.cc/4UTP-DMME]. The New York Times 
reported the existence of these settlements following  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2019] HUSHING CONTRACTS 177 
 
 
 
creating a pattern of behavior extending from at least 2002 until 2016 and 
directed towards producers, TV hosts, anchors, and on-air personalities.66 
The New York Times reported that, “[a]s an influential figure in the 
newsroom, Mr. O’Reilly would create a bond with some women by offering 
advice and promising to help them professionally. He then would pursue 
sexual relationships with them, causing some to fear that if they rebuffed 
him, their careers would stall.”67 Allegations from two additional women, 
not party to hush contracts, aligned with this pattern.68  
While less anecdotally rich, a few studies have carefully tracked the costs 
of sexual harassment at the team or organizational level. In one, researchers 
noted that “sexual harassment is an organizational stressor that has 
significant, negative outcomes for targets.”69 The study noted that these 
negative outcomes, including career interruption, had “consistently been 
found across a variety of organizational settings and across cultures.”70 For 
example, researchers identified a “food services organization in the mid-
Atlantic United States” where teams were organized such that they 
“operated independently of one another (i.e., a loosely coupled 
organization)” and where financial data was available for each team’s 
performance.71 Over time, the researchers learned that incidence of sexual 
harassment negatively impacted each factor they monitored–––the amount 
of conflict in teams, team cohesion, the willingness of team members to 
engage in activities on behalf of the whole, and financial performance.72 A 
2013 paper by Anne Maass, Silvia Galdi, and Mara Cadinu confirms that 
power imbalances can be self-perpetuating, so that more hierarchical 
 
more than five dozen interviews with current and former employees of Fox News and its former 
and current parent companies, News Corporation and 21st Century Fox; representatives for the 
network; and people close to Mr. O’Reilly and the women. . . . The Times also examined more 
than 100 pages of documents and court filings related to the complaints.  
Id.  
66. Settlements were reached with Rachel Witlieb Bernstein in 2002, Andrea Mackris in 2004, 
Rebecca Gomez Diamond in 2011, Laurie Dhue in 2016, and Juliet Huddy in 2016. See id.  
67. Id.  
68. See id. 
69. Jana L. Raver & Michele J. Gelfand, Beyond the Individual Victim: Linking Sexual 
Harassment, Team Processes, and Team Performance, 48 ACAD. MGMT. J. 387, 388 (2005) (emphasis 
added); see also Leora Eisenstadt & Deanna Geddes, Suppressed Anger, Retaliation Doctrine, and 
Workplace Culture, 20 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 147 (2018) (explaining that employees’ suppressed anger 
surrounding perceived injustices in the workplace which go unaddressed by management leads to 
negative organizational outcomes). 
70. Raver & Gelfand, supra note 69, at 388.  
71. Id. at 390. 
72. Id. at 393–94. 
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workplaces see more harassment on balance than workplaces in 
organiztations where power is less stratified.73 
We can put some dollar figures on these costs. Turnover in harassing 
organizations can be large.74 The EEOC has estimated that “over two years, 
as a result of sexual harassment, job turnover ($24.7 million), sick leave 
($14.9 million), and decreased individual ($93.7 million) and workgroup 
($193.8[ million]) productivity had cost the government a total of $327.1 
million.”75 While this figure may seem quite high, it makes sense. As 
individuals are made subject to unwelcome, unwanted advances or to 
generally hostile workplaces, they probably focus less on day-to-day tasks 
and devote increasing energy to avoidance, minimizing exposure, and 
ensuring one’s own safety. In today’s economy, where many of us work in 
collaborative teams, this social isolation can be devastating to productivity 
and group cohesion.76 For these reasons, the EEOC termed sexual 
harassment in workplaces an “organization stressor.”77  
Other costs of hush contracts are harder to quantify.78 For example, when 
hush contracts keep secret the details of sexual misconduct, they make it 
next to impossible for new entrants to the workplace (or community, 
market, etc.) to be certain of their safety. The effects of this uncertainty 
deserve exploration. How are candidates for entry-level positions 
navigating the information asymmetry they face when deciding whether to 
enter into a new workplace full of landmines they couldn’t unearth through 
even the most exhaustive due diligence?79 Additionally, the widespread use 
 
73. Anne Maass, Mara Cadinu & Silvia Galdi, Sexual Harassment: Motivations and 
Consequences, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GENDER AND PSYCHOLOGY 341, 351 (Michelle K. Ryan 
& Nyla R. Branscombe eds. 2013); see also Parramore, supra note 23. 
74. See EEOC, TASK FORCE, supra note 39, at 22. 
75. Id.  
76. Id. at 21 (“Work withdrawal and disengagement due to harassment can also go beyond the 
individual to affect team and group relationships.”). 
77. Id. at 22. 
78. Early research reports show the #MeToo movement will have profound financial and 
reputational consequences for firms seeking to limit their exposure to #MeToo allegations, though the 
specific impact of the sexual misconduct at issue on workplaces is less clear. See Press Release, Globe 
Newsire, Research Finds Businesses May Soon Feel Financial Impacts of #MeToo in Staffing and 
Revenue (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/Globe%20Newswire/4fd26841325e4724d0322f09 
a11e0013 [https://perma.cc/LKF9-57ZH] (finding that, for instance, “[a]pproximately 55% of 
professional women surveyed are less likely to apply for a job and 49% are less likely to buy products 
or stock from a company with a public #MeToo allegation”); see also Steve Hendrix et al., #MeToo Has 
a ‘Chilling Effect’ on Workplace Camaraderie, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 28, 2018), https://www.chicagotribun 
e.com/business/ct-metoo-workplace-camaraderie-20180128-story.html [https://perma.cc/GHT8-GAW 
N] (“As a wave of sexual misconduct allegations against prominent men crested in recent months, 
relations between men and women in workplaces across the country have shifted . . .  sometimes toward 
more honest discussions of what's not OK at work, but also toward silence and exclusion.”). 
79. As far as we can tell, there is not much published advice for prospective employees concerned 
with avoiding organizations marred by sexual misconduct. At the same time, some blogs do advise 
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of hush contracts creates conditions under which potential harassers may be 
more likely to prey on potential victims. These costs are probably even 
greater when harassment in a particular firm is especially blatant; when it is 
an open secret that employees have harassed coworkers and had their 
misdeeds buried under the legalese of settlement agreements, firms send a 
message to would-be harassers that they too will find protection—rather 
than accountability—in management.80  
The final cost we want to add to the ledger is the deprivation of survivors’ 
ability to openly and honestly talk about their experiences and to form 
coalitions with other survivors. Increasingly, those who have experienced 
sexual violence and have shared their stories are said to have “come out” as 
survivors, in an explicit reference to the decision of LGBTQ people to claim 
their identity publicly.81 While imperfect, the analogy implicit in this lexical 
shift is instructive. In some ways, the experiences of coming out as a queer 
person and coming out as a survivor of sexual misconduct are related82—
and where they are not, there are often lessons to be learned through their 
juxtaposition.83  
 
women interviewing for new jobs to think carefuly about questions they can ask to better understand the 
firm’s commitment to gender parity and equal compensation for equal work. See Lisa Gates, How to 
Take a Leadership Role in Your Job Interview ala #MeToo, SHE NEGOTIATES (June 26, 2018), https://w 
ww.shenegotiates.com/blog/how-to-take-leadership-role-jo-interview-questions-metoo [https://perma.c 
c/P73L-H6KX] (“the #MeToo movement has made it possible, I say imperative, for you to show you 
[sic] potential employer that your eyes are wide open,” particularly in the context of gender partity). 
80. New research suggests that employees are less likely to come forward to report misconduct, 
for instance, when they perceive it to be an open secret. See, e.g., Insiya Hussain & Subra Tangirala, 
Why Open Secrets Exist in Organizations, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 14, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/01/wh 
y-open-secrets-exist-in-organizations [https://perma.cc/6PZD-D9AK] (“[A]s issues become more 
common knowledge among frontline employees, the willingness of any individual employee to bring 
those issues to the attention of the top-management decreased. Instead of speaking up, what we observed 
among our participants was something like the bystander effect.”).  
81. See, e.g., Nico Lang, Op-Ed, What It’s Like Coming Out as a Sexual Assault Survivor, 
ADVOCATE (Jan. 14, 2014, 11:15 AM), https://www.advocate.com/commentary/2014/01/14/op-ed-what 
-it%E2%80%99s-come-out-sexual-assault-survivor [https://perma.cc/D9X2-RZHE]; see also Rachel 
Kuo, 6 Things to Navigate While Coming Out to Yourself as a Survivor of Sexual Violence, EVERYDAY 
FEMINISM (Jan. 7, 2015), https://everydayfeminism.com/2015/01/coming-out-to-self-as-survivor/ [https 
://perma.cc/BJS9-EBZS].  
82. LGBTQ people are disproportionately likely to be affected by sexual violence, with 
transgender individuals and bisexual women most at risk. See, e.g., Sexual Assault and the LGBTQ 
Community, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/resources/sexual-assault-and-the-lgbt-commu 
nity [https://perma.cc/CF9J-P28D] (“As a community, LGBTQ people face higher rates of poverty, 
stigma, and marginalization, which put us at greater risk for sexual assault.”). What’s more, many 
LGBTQ survivors face discrimination when attempting to access services because of their identity. See 
id. (“85 percent of victim advocates surveyed by the [National Coalition of Anti-Violence Projects] 
reported having worked with an LGBTQ survivor who was denied services because of their sexual 
orientation or gender identity.”). 
83. For just one example, think about the fact that only very seldom are those who come out as 
queer or as survivors of sexual violence sharing completely new information. For many, the decision to 
come out is instead the first time they claim as their own insults or rumors with which they are well 
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The speech act of “coming out” has long been an integral element of the 
LGBTQ movement’s political and cultural strategy—as well as a critical 
part of many LGBTQ peoples’ self-discovery and affirmation. Specifically, 
the call to “come out” and to do so in political terms is deeply entrenched 
in LGBTQ movement history,84 and in the academic study of gender and 
sexuality.85 
One such example is that of Eve Sedgwick’s Epistemology of the Closet, 
a pivotal text in queer theory in which Sedgwick blurs the line between the 
public and the private.86 She argues that there’s a sort of language to silence, 
that is, when we reveal and hide different elements of ourselves, we play an 
evolving and performative role (think, for instance, of certain celebrities 
whose queerness is widely understood but never publicly acknowledged).87 
In the constant navigation of secrecy and disclosure,88 Sedgwick suggests 
that queer people weigh risk and reward, sometimes choosing to identify 
within a particular label (e.g. “LGBTQ”) or to elude labels altogether.89 That 
throngs of LGBTQ have come out not once but over and over, and that they 
have latched onto these shared labels for their community, has likely led to 
the growing support for LGBTQ rights today, as fewer and fewer Americans 
 
acquainted. For a discussion, see EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 80 (1990) 
(“Living in and hence coming out of the closet are never matters of the purely hermetic; the personal 
and political geographies to be surveyed here are instead the more imponderable and convulsive ones of 
the open secret.”). 
84. Harvey Milk was known to encourage young LGBTQ people to come out to their families 
and friends in order to normalize queerness. See, e.g., Jennifer Knapp, ‘You Must Come Out’: How 
Harvey Milk’s Challenge Resonates with Gay Christians Today, HUFFPOST (Feb. 2, 2016), https://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/jennifer-knapp/how-harvey-milks-challeng_b_5960258.html [https://perma.cc/XT 
K7-XYJ4] (“Gay brothers and sisters, you must come out. Come out to your parents. I know that it is 
hard and will hurt them, but think about how they will hurt you in the voting booth! Come out to your 
relatives. Come out to your friends, if indeed they are your friends. Come out to your neighbors, to your 
fellow workers, to the people who work where you eat and shop. Come out only to the people you know, 
and who know you, not to anyone else. But once and for all, break down the myths. Destroy the lies and 
distortions. For your sake. For their sake.”). 
85. See, e.g., SEDGWICK, supra note 83; Michael Warner, FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET: QUEER 
POLITICS AND SOCIAL THEORY (1993) (cataloguing early works in the queer theory tradition, including 
pieces exploring the political dynamics of “coming out”). 
86. SEDGWICK, supra note 83. 
87. See id. at 3 (“‘Closeted-ness’ itself is a performance initiated as such by the speech act of a 
silence—not a particular silence, but a silence that accrues particularity by fits and starts, in relation to 
the discourse that surrounds and differentially constitutes it.”). 
88. See id. at 68 (“[E]very encounter with a new classful of students, to say nothing of a new 
boss, social worker, loan officer, landlord, doctor, erects new closets whose fraught and characteristic 
laws of optics and physics exact from at least gay people new surveys, new calculations, new draughts 
and requisitions of secrecy or disclosure. Even an out gay person deals daily with interlocutors about 
whom she doesn’t know whether they know or not . . . .”). 
89. Id. at 13. 
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report opposing full equality for LGBTQ people.90 But for members of the 
LGBTQ community, coming out is about far more than policy victories; 
“[i]t is a shift from the private sphere to the public, and also a shift from 
silence into speech.”91 This courage and desire to control the narrative may 
link together the #MeToo movement and the ongoing struggle for LGBTQ 
rights.92  
Consider, as an analogy, the recent First Circuit case of Franchina v. City 
of Providence, where a lesbian firefighter was driven from her workplace 
by incessant harassment from her male subordinates.93 The harassment was 
not linked to desire by the subordinates for their supervisor; instead, the 
harassers were trying to police their supervisor’s gender presentation and 
performance—effectively penalizing her for being LGBTQ.94 As Judge 
Rovner, in a Seventh Circuit case, concluded: 
Lesbian women and gay men upend our gender paradigms by their 
very status—causing us to question . . . antiquated and anachronistic 
ideas about what roles men and women should play in their 
relationships. Who is dominant and who is submissive? Who is 
charged with earning a living and who makes a home? . . . In this way 
the roots of sexual orientation discrimination and gender 
discrimination wrap around each other inextricably.95  
This citation offers perhaps the clearest illustration of a principle stated 
earlier in this paper: sexual violence is about power and any attempt to 
combat the prevalence of sexual misconduct in society ought to grasp it at 
the roots.  
 
90. “By a margin of nearly two-to-one (62% to 32%), more Americans now say they favor 
allowing gays and lesbians to marry than say they are opposed.” Support for Same-Sex Marriage Grows, 
Even Among Groups that Had Been Skeptical, PEW RES. CTR. (June 26, 2017), http://www.people-
press.org/2017/06/26/support-for-same-sex-marriage-grows-even-among-groups-that-had-been-skeptic 
al/ [https://perma.cc/TK9S-6HLF] (describing, as well, that “[v]iews on same-sex marriage have shifted 
dramatically in recent years. As recently as 2010, more Americans opposed (48%) than favored (42%) 
allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally”). 
91. Jen Bacon, Getting the Story Straight: Coming Out Narratives and the Possibility of a 
Cultural Rhetoric, 17 WORLD ENGLISHES 249, 251 (1998). 
92. See, e.g., Brian Soucek, Queering Sexual Harassment Law, 128 YALE L.J.F. 67, 69–70 
(2018), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/Soucek_ncrxrrgq.pdf [https://perma.cc/LQ28-LAL4] 
(“Hearing the story of a queer harassment victim teaches (or reminds) us that sexual harassment, in all 
its forms and no matter the sexuality of the victim, is ultimately about policing gender roles and 
hierarchies.”). 
93. 881 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2018); see also Soucek, supra note 92, at 70–72. 
94. Soucek, supra note 92, at 83 (“And while her harassment occasionally took sexualized forms, 
it was not about desire; it was about power and exclusion.”); see also Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 
830 F.3d 698, 706 (7th Cir. 2016), rev'd en banc, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017). 
95. Soucek, supra note 92, at 80–81 (quoting Hively, 830 F.3d at 706). 
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Perhaps most critically both the #MeToo and LGBTQ movements owe 
their success to the willingness of courageous individuals to continue to tell 
their stories. Both are “built on repetition—the ‘too’ is crucial, for only 
cumulatively do the stories show how common sex-based harassment 
continues to be.”96 By helping everyday people acknowledge their 
proximity to the crisis of sexual violence and anti-LGBTQ hate, coming out 
familiarizes the “other” and paves the way for political advocacy on behalf 
of those affected. For our purposes, coming out also allows you to stand and 
be counted—for the total impact of sexual wrongdoing to be counted not 
only in numbers but in stories. When hush contracts choke off those stories, 
therefore, their impact extends far beyond one workplace or one individual; 
the silence reverberates across a movement whose chorus always needs one 
more voice. 
B. The Costs of Nonenforcement: What do Hush Contracts Achieve 
We now turn to the other side of the ledger: the benefits of enforcing 
hush contracts. The bottom line here is simply stated: proponents argue that 
hush contracts are necessary to a privately-ordered anti-harassment regime. 
That is, because all agree that anti-harassment law needs private plaintiffs 
and the private bar requires settlements to be economically viable, the real 
question is whether such settlements could exist without enforceable 
confidentiality clauses. The defenders of hush contracts take significant 
comfort from the status quo, where hush contracts are both enforceable and 
nearly omnipresent.97 They also point out, not unreasonably, that plaintiffs 
may want secrecy, even if defendants are indifferent to it.  
Again here we are proceeding without compelling empirical evidence as 
to the effects at equilibrium of confidentiality in litigation.98 The studies that 
do exist are often observational in nature—finding that slightly more, or 
slightly fewer, cases are filed after a particular kind of confidentiality 
regulation is put into place.99 But ex post litigation data tells us very little 
 
96. Id. at 72. 
97. See, e.g., Russell-Kraft, supra note 18 (Gillian Thomas of the ACLU Women’s Rights 
Protect observed, “If an employer can’t get a settlement that’s going to provide a [NDA], employers are 
going to settle less, they’re going to force whoever is bringing the claim to think long and hard about 
pursuing litigation instead, and litigation is a horrible alternative”).  
98.  Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Hidden from the Public by Order of the Court: The Case Against 
Government-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REV. 711, 726 (2004) (finding no evidence in data of a chilling 
effect); James E. Rooks, Jr., Settlements and Secrets: Is the Sunshine Chilly?, 55 S.C. L. REV. 859, 867–
68 (2004) (reviewing anecdotal evidence of a chilling effect); Drahozal & Hines, supra note 33, at 1467–
69 (noting lack of evidence). 
99. “In those states that have developed the strongest anti-secrecy regulations, there has been no 
indication of a resulting court logjam, or even that settlement rates have gone down.” Richard A. Zitrin, 
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about the effects of confidentiality on the first order (bad) behavior that the 
regulatory regime was designed to govern. 
Indeed, much of the work here is frankly theoretical in ambition and tone. 
Scott Moss, whose 2007 paper on the economics of confidentiality remains 
the best and most complete approach,100 describes a model in which 
confidentiality might, by increasing the bargaining range, improve the 
likelihood of settlement.101 That is, confidentiality can be priced, and parties 
can extract value for that concession.102  
But the problem in determining whether secrecy promotes deterrence is 
that information about wrongdoing has competing effects. On the one hand, 
making litigation fully transparent (by prohibiting hush contracts) might 
reduce the likelihood of settlement post-filing, and therefore the present 
value of claims and deterrence. But, on the other hand, potential defendants 
in a transparent regime may be more likely to “settle” pre-filing so as to 
avoid the publicity of litigation, even if they cannot be assured that such 
settlements will be truly secret.103 There is no easy way at present to 
disentangle such effects, and, as Moss concludes, the “big picture” is 
“indeterminate.”104 Complicating matters further, given lawyer networks, 
even confidential settlements are already, in effect, semi-public.105 
Recent proposals have tried to normalize and publicize such intermediate 
confidentiality regimes. A recent example is Levmore and Fagan’s “semi-
confidentiality,” where “the disclosure of the substance of settlement but 
not the magnitude of monetary payments” ought to be required by law.106 
Levmore and Fagan argue that semi-confidentiality “rewards plaintiffs in 
proportion to their injuries and encourages all of them to come forward with 
their individual claims.”107 They seem reasonably confident that 
semi-confidentiality will benefit plaintiffs on the whole, allowing them to 
make better strategic litigation choices and recover potentially more from 
 
The Case Against Secret Settlements (or, What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You), 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY 
LEGAL ETHICS 115, 118 (1999) (footnote omitted). 
100. Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential Settlements, 
105 MICH. L. REV. 867 (2007); see also Zitrin, supra note 99, at 118. 
101. Moss, supra note 100, at 878. 
102. See Levmore & Fagan, supra note 17, at 314. 
103. Moss, supra note 100, at 891. 
104. Id. 
105. Ben Depoorter, Essay, Law in the Shadow of Bargaining: The Feedback Effect of Civil 
Settlements, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 957, 966–67 (2010) (noting evidence from survey that few attorneys 
found confidentiality clauses a barrier to learning about settlement behavior). 
106. Levmore & Fagan, supra note 17, at 311. 
107. Id. at 341. 
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defendants.108 But the claim is difficult to evaluate without a better 
specification as to when evidence from the real world would falsify it.109  
Putting aside the deterrence problem, victim compensation alone might 
justify the current regime. Wealth transfers to victims as part of confidential 
settlements are not trivial.110 Survivors of sexual misconduct can sometimes 
recoup significant compensatory awards, which can give them a sense of 
closure as well as tangible gains. According to the EEOC, from 2010 to 
2016, “employers have paid out $698.7 million to employees alleging 
harassment through the [EEOC’s] administrative enforcement pre-litigation 
process alone.”111 Some of these settlements have also been quite substantial 
on an individual basis. A study cited by the EEOC and conducted by a 
national liability insurance provider examined “a representative sample of 
closed employment dispute claims” and revealed “that 19% of the matters 
resulted in defense and settlement costs averaging $125,000 per claim.”112  
The frequency of sexual wrongdoing complaints, their severity, and the 
increasing costs of settlements have led companies to take preemptive steps 
to guard against unforeseen pay-outs. Companies are now diverting 
substantial funds to insurance policies for sexual misconduct settlements, 
though most companies are not taking parallel steps to address the harm of 
sexual misconduct within their organizations by, for instance, re-examining 
the demographic composition of the organization’s leadership or 
restructuring the firm.113 
Aggregating total payouts to survivors does risk obscuring differences in 
the rate of sexual misconduct for specific communities, like those with 
lower incomes and communities of color. In one of the only studies of its 
kind, researchers recently conducted a six-year study on anonymously 
 
108. See id. at 348 (“Translucency drives up the costs of settlement, whether [the plaintiff] 
underestimates its value or not, and can deter [a tortfeasor] ex ante or provide compensation to individual 
victims ex post.”); cf. Alison Lothes, Comment, Quality, Not Quantity: An Analysis of Confidential 
Settlements and Litigants’ Economic Incentives, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 433, 456 (2005) (describing how 
lack of information about settlement amount might increase litigation costs). 
109. We are also not convinced that the argument fully accounts for the public benefits of 
adjudication, nor the wealth effects between plaintiffs that Moss describes. Moss, supra note 100, at 
893. 
110. See Parramore, supra note 23. 
111. EEOC, TASK FORCE, supra note 39, at 18. 
112. EEOC, TASK FORCE, supra note 39, at 19; EMPLOYEE CHARGE TRENDS ACROSS THE UNITED 
STATES, HISCOX, (2015), https://www.hiscox.com/documents/The-2015-Hiscox-Guide-to-Employee-
Lawsuits-Employee-charge-trends-across-the-United-States.pdf [https://perma.cc/CB73-PV7R]. 
113. The 2016 EEOC report contains helpful, yet simple, guidance on this matter. Quoting the 
writer James Baldwin, Robert J. Bies, Professor of Management and Founder of the Executive Masters 
in Leadership Program at Georgetown University’s business school, commented, “Not everything that 
is faced can be changed, but nothing can be changed until it is faced.” EEOC, TASK FORCE, supra note 
39, at 1.  
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coded harassment cases settled in Chicago, and found that claimants, on 
average, recovered less than $60,000 each.114 Indeed, an analysis of 
unpublished EEOC data reveals that “sexual harassment appears to happen 
more frequently in industries dominated by low-wage workers, with 
minority women working in services industries especially vulnerable.”115 In 
those industries, women file 300% more claims than in professional 
fields.116 This would suggest that the individuals filing most often are likely 
those who need the pay-outs most––and therefore may be more likely to 
settle at lower amounts, which fail to deter tortfeasors from repeat 
wrongdoing. 
Lastly comes the intuitive argument that enforcing hush contracts 
respects the private wishes of the parties involved, and does so quickly, 
without impeding the efficient resolution of disputes by the courts.117 Arthur 
Miller’s early statement of this argument more than twenty-five years ago 
remains canonical.118 Miller starts by pointing out that the public right of 
access within American jurisprudence has never been absolute.119 Rather, 
“[the] justice system recognizes a variety of situations in which 
confidentiality is not only acceptable, but essential,” like “[d]iscovery, 
 
114. Minna J. Kotkin, Outing Outcomes: An Empirical Study of Confidential Employment 
Discrimination Settlements, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 148 (2007). 
115. Parramore, supra note 23. 
116. See id.  
117. These privacy considerations also beg the question of how we ought to think about false 
accusations, specifically those made in the context of sexual misconduct. Scholars and commentators 
are often preoccupied with this question, spilling a considerable amount of ink debating what value 
ought to be placed on falsely accused defendants’ rights to avoid harm, even should they settle with an 
accuser to avoid the spotlight. See Levmore & Fagan, supra note 17, at 344 (“Mandatory transparency, 
as required by some sunshine laws, likely goes too far because news of [a plaintiff’s] claim will bring 
forth claimants who erroneously, irrationally, or strategically believe [the tortfeasor] injured them.”); 
see also Ayres, supra note 17, at 77 (“NDAs may also help protect those who are falsely accused or 
have a valid legal defense from the negative reputational consequences of having been accused and 
having paid to settle an accusation of sexual misconduct.”); Bret Stephens, For Once, I’m Grateful for 
Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/04/opinion/trump-kavanaugh-
ford-allegations.html [http://perma.cc/VK2Q-J752] (“Falsely accusing a person of sexual assault is 
nearly as despicable as sexual assault itself. It inflicts psychic, familial, reputational and professional 
harms that can last a lifetime.”). Nevertheless, commentators fixated on the threat of false accusations 
often overstate the frequency of unsubstantiated allegations. See Katie Heaney, Almost No One is Falsely 
Accused of Rape, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.thecut.com/article/false-rape-accusations.html 
[https://perma.cc/5PRP-L3A6] (explaining that, even though five percent of reported rapes may be 
unsubstantiated, only eight to ten percent of rapes are reported, meaning that false accusations account 
for only around half of a percent of all occurances of rape). In short, while a concern for those whose 
livelihoods may be affected by unsubstantial allegations is well-founded, scholars’ concern over the 
frequency of such allegations is often misplaced. For our purposes, false accusations are therefore an 
important but peripheral concern.  
118. Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 427, 464 (1991).  
119. See id. at 429. 
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grand jury proceedings, settlement negotiations, and jury deliberations.”120 
He observes that in each of these instances, the public’s interest in knowing 
the details of a case pale in comparison with the justice system’s interest in 
the resolution of disputes.121 Since the primary aim “of the judicial system 
is to resolve private disputes, not to generate information for the public,” 
we must favor privacy over transparency whenever they are in tension.122  
Unlike Miller, however, not all scholars frame their arguments in such 
absolute terms. Ian Ayres has recently rejected what he characterizes as the 
“all-or-nothing choice” between enforcing or not enforcing these NDAs.123 
The key question for Ayres is whether or not enforcing the NDA would 
enable repeat wrongdoing—something Miller did not grapple with it at 
all.124 He balances the court’s commitment to individual privacy and 
honoring valid contracts with the public’s interest in avoiding harm to third 
parties who are prevented from identifying patterns of wrongdoing by 
strategically employed NDAs.125 Ayres argues that courts should hold 
NDAs unenforceable if they prohibit survivors from reporting to the EEOC, 
if the accused does not misrepresent past dealings between accuser and the 
accused, and “if the underlying survivor allegations are deposited in an 
information escrow that would be released for an investigation by the EEOC 
if another complaint is received against the same perpetrator.”126 
To be sure, Miller and Ayres raise important points. Plaintiffs’ interests 
in their own privacy, particularly when that privacy is threatened by 
invasive discovery tactics or the media, are important; we should worry, on 
the margin, about chilling plaintiffs.127 And yet, given the evidence that we 
have adduced, it is at least unclear if confidentiality is systemically useful, 
 
120. See id.  
121. See id.  
122. See id. at 441; see also id. at 431 (“If public access assumes an importance on a par with the 
system’s concern for resolving disputes among the litigants, the traditional balance would be upset and 
the courts diverted from their primary mission.”).  
123. See Ayres, supra note 17, at 77, 85.  
124. See id. at 78 (“[T]hese provisions would deter or incapacitate the worst types of repeat 
offending . . . . [but] these reform proposals would do almost nothing to deter offenders from committing 
their first offense.”). 
125. See id. (“The contestable choice here is to suggest that the legitimate privacy interests 
predominate with regard to first offenses, but not with regard to offenders who have embarked on a 
succession of settlements.”). 
126. Id. at 79. 
127. Plaintiffs’ lawyer Debra Katz has observed that “[f]or some victims, the promise of 
confidentiality is actually alluring.” Russell-Kraft, supra note 18. She explained that survivors “want 
their privacy protected and if they feel like they can’t end these situations with a private resolution, 
they’re not going to come forward.” Id. 
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especially when it results from power and informational imbalances that are 
endemic in this arena.128  
Regulating or eliminating the use of hush contracts thus mainly involves 
a tradeoff between the privacy and compensatory duties owed to survivors 
and the public’s right to know. Writing off the privacy interests of survivors 
of sexual misconduct as irrelevant factors in the analysis compounds the 
damage already inflicted. Yet, with empathy for those who have suffered 
themselves or witnessed that suffering, those giving shape to legal 
frameworks must weigh those privacy interests alongside the community’s 
interest in accountability for wrongdoing.  
As Anita Allen has explained, “privacy isn’t everything.”129 On moral 
grounds, we regularly accept that our desire for privacy is circumscribed by 
our community’s interest in health and safety.130 Who would not agree, for 
that matter, that it is important to hold each other accountable for actions 
we take that affect the well-being of other members of our community? 
Allen describes these communal ties aptly, noting that “[a]ccountability 
norms are ties that bind.”131 If we consider ourselves to be in a community 
with survivors of sexual misconduct, we have to grapple with the interests 
of privacy and the potential harms of allowing harm to be secreted from 
view. Accounting for these costs and benefits needs to be far more 
thoughtful; there are costs to confidentiality which are real and need 
measuring. 
Balancing this admixture of public losses and private benefits is a task 
that has social welfare implications. In the last year, a number of states have 
begun to propose and pass legislation in response. We earlier described New 
York’s approach to hush contracts, which solves one problem (hush 
contracts inconsiderately agreed-to) without dealing at all with the public 
values at issue.132 Other states, like Washington, have recently followed 
 
128. Elizabeth Bernstein, Power’s Role in Sexual Harassment, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 5, 2018, 
10:33 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/powers-role-in-sexual-harassment-1517844769 [https://perm 
a.cc/C4NT-4WEP]; see also Zeba Blay, Sexual Harassment Isn’t About Sex, It’s About Power, 
HUFFPOST (Mar. 23, 2017, 5:12 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/sexual-harassment-isnt-ab 
out-sex-its-about-power_us_58d13b9fe4b00705db52c340 [https://perma.cc/KV5T-JQFS]; Claire 
Potter, Sexual Harassment Is About Power. Why Not Fight It as We Do Bullying?, GUARDIAN (Feb. 10, 
2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/feb/10/sexual-harassment-power-
bullying-metoo [https://perma.cc/VV67-8RXA].  
129. Anita L. Allen, 2003 Daniel J. Meador Lecture: Privacy Isn’t Everything: Accountability as 
a Personal and Social Good, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1375, 1375 (2003). 
130. Id. at 1387. 
131. Id. at 1389. 
132. See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text. 
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New York’s signaling approach.133 Moreover, Congress,134 and a number of 
states, including Florida,135 have bills in draft form that would accomplish 
much the same thing, and New Jersey has passed a similar bill,136 but none 
had advanced past drafting stages as of the early winter of 2019.137  
One singular form of legislative medicine comes from California. In 
September 2018, Governor Jerry Brown signed a series of laws that 
significantly changed the landscape governing sexual harassment claims in 
California.138 In addition to a rule that changed the burden of proof and 
persuasion in plaintiffs’ favor,139 one of the newly enacted statutes, S.B. 
820, effectively made it unlawful (and against public policy) for an 
employer to create a nondisclosure clause in a sexual harassment case (and 
related causes of action) for any claims “related to” a claim filed in court or 
in an administrative proceeding.140  
The California Act thus permits some hush contracts (those entered post-
demand letter but pre-suit),141 and explicitly provides that victims can 
request nondisclosure of personally identifying facts, and that parties can 
freely agree to keep the amount of settlement secret (but not the underlying 
 
133. 2018 Wash. Legis. Serv. Ch. 117 (S.S.B. 5996) (West) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 49.44.210 (2018)). 
134. See, e.g., Ending the Monopoly of Power Over Workplace Harassment through Education 
and Reporting Act, H.R. 6406, 115th Cong., 2d Sess. (2018); Sunlight in Workplace Harassment Act, 
S. 2454, 115th Cong., 2d Sess. (2018); Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 Reform Act, H.R. 
4822, 115th Cong., 2d Sess. (2018).  
135. H.B. 1259, 172d Leg. Sess. (Fla. 2018) (making nondisclosure clauses in sexual harassment 
settlements void as against public policy). 
136. 2019 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 39 (S. 121) (West) (codified at N.J. REV. STAT. § 10:5–12.7 
(West)). 
137. See generally Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Legal Implications of the MeToo Movement, 103 
MINN. L. REV. 229, 255 (2018) (collecting extant legislative responses). 
138. 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 953 (S.B. 820) (West) (codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1001 
(West 2018)) (prohibiting nondisclosure of sexual assault in settlement agreements); 2018 Cal. Legis. 
Serv. Ch. 955 (S.B. 1300) (West) (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12940, 12965, 12923, 12950.2, 
12964.5 (West 2018)) (creating new employee protections in sexual harassment actions); 2018 Cal. 
Legis. Serv. Ch. 956 (S.B. 1343) (West) (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12950, 12950.1 (West 2018)) 
(expanding requiments for sexual harassment training to all employees of employers with five or more 
employees). 
139. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12923 (West 2018); see also Paula M. Weber & Cara Adams, California 
Laws Change Legal Landscape on Sexual Harassment, PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP 
(Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.pillsburylaw.com/en/news-and-insights/california-laws-change-harassment 
-landscape.html [https://perma.cc/N4YU-JCH4]. 
140. 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 953 (S.B. 820) (West) (codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1001 
(West 2018)). 
141. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1001(a) (West 2018). This point has been noted by practitioners. 
See Legal Alert: California Employers to Face Raft of New #MeToo Laws, FISHER PHILLIPS (Oct. 1, 
2018), https://www.fisherphillips.com/resources-alerts-california-employers-to-face-raft-of-new [https: 
//perma.cc/4XNF-D4XH] (“Therefore, there may be a narrow set of circumstances in which such clauses 
may still be utilized in sexual harassment and other similar cases.”). 
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facts).142 But, overall, it represents a significant strike against hush 
contracts, and would seriously dampen the harm that they cause. Courts 
considering California-drafted contracts need read no further in this paper: 
hush contracts are unenforceable in the Sunshine State.  
California’s statutory solution rests on the understanding that hush 
contracts engender third-party harm and consequently require public 
responses.143 For courts in jurisdictions outside of California, where 
statutory rules are not yet in hand, ordinary contract law would seem to be 
an ill-fit to the problem of policing such diffuse injuries. However, as we 
will now argue, common law contract law does have a vehicle for asserting 
the interests of the public at large within private disputes. Though long 
neglected, and often criticized, public policy doctrine might be just what is 
needed to highlight the consequences of enforcing hush contracts. 
II. PUBLIC POLICY & HUSH CONTRACTS 
We should not be surprised by the extent that current approaches largely 
fail to grapple effectively with the problems posed by hush contracts. The 
problem is hard: how to balance the needs of autonomy with those of 
distribution, or, more concretely, how to decide when the state will not 
recognize freely-chosen bargains. Happily, public policy doctrine is ideally 
suited to that balancing task. Unfortunately, it is a doctrine in somewhat bad 
odor. After all, it is said to be “never argued at all but when other points 
fail.”144  
If that were not promising enough, almost all discussions of public 
policies begin equinely. The oft-repeated dicta (now almost 200 years old) 
claims that public policy “is a very unruly horse, and when once you get 
astride it you never know where it will carry you.”145 Others warn that public 
policy is “a vast, confusing and rather mysterious area of the law.”146  
 
142. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1001(c), (e) (West 2018). 
143. S. Floor Analysis, S.B. 820, 2017-2018 Reg. Sess., at 6 (Cal. 2018), http://leginfo.legislature. 
ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB820# [https://perma.cc/8VRW-LD98] 
(“This bill addresses . . . the use of non-disclosure provisions in settlement agreements, often referred to 
as ‘secret settlements.’ These agreements bind people to silence, generally with regard to all of the 
underlying allegations in a civil case. As has been seen in widespread media coverage, these secret 
settlements have the effect of preventing word from spreading about harassing or discriminatory 
behavior. This is part of what allows serial harassers to go undetected, sometimes for years.”). 
144. Richardson v. Mellish (1824) 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303, 2 Bing. 229, 251–52 (Burrough, J.) 
(C.P.). 
145. Id. 
146. George A. Strong, The Enforceability of Illegal Contracts, 12 HASTINGS L.J. 347, 347 
(1961).  
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It’s difficult to know what to make of this hand-wringing. No one has fit 
public policy cases into a neat box.147 But that is probably true of any 
frequently argued problem that requires judgment. The litigated cases will 
be roughly divided between wins and losses,148 and courts with varying 
priors will weigh even cognizable standards distinctly. Indeed, one 
commentator, discussing Corbin’s “exhaustive and almost scientific” 
treatment on public policy, counts “128 different subspecies of the public 
policy defense in action,” and claims that the whole “reads a bit like Charles 
Darwin’s The Zoology of the Voyage of H.M.S. Beagle.”149 
Rather than re-catalogue this menagerie, we instead aim to illuminate by 
setting out a few common fact patterns through which confidentiality 
clauses and public policy have tangled.150 Our goal is not to be 
comprehensive. Indeed, “gaps remain and will always remain since no one 
can foresee every way in which the wickedness of man may disrupt the order 
of society.”151 We moreover do not limit ourselves to published policy 
defenses to hush contracts for a simple, inconvenient, reason—there are 
almost no such cases in the recorded history of Anglo-American law.152 Our 
approach must therefore build from a broader base. 
 
147. Julie M. Spanbauer, Selling Sex: Analyzing the Improper Use Defense to Contract 
Enforcement Through the Lens of Carroll v. Beardon, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 693, 718 (2011) (arguing 
that courts typically use an incoherent multi-part approach adapted from the Restatement). Friedman, 
for instance, found a forty-five percent success rate for public policy defenses based in a statute. David 
Adam Friedman, Bringing Order to Contracts Against Public Policy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 563, 566, 
581 (2012). One should be cautious in interpreting this result—case and opinion selection make it 
impossible to understand much about a doctrine’s strength by how it is resolved in reported opinions. 
What is most striking about Friedman’s paper is that more than 1000 cases talked about the defense in a 
six-month period. Id. at 577. 
148. Friedman shows this precisely. See Friedman, supra note 147, at 567. 
149. Id. at 572–73. 
150. See Stewart J. Schwab, Wrongful Discharge Law and the Search for Third-Party Effects, 74 
TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1954–56 (1996) (discussing the risks of pigeonholing public policy in the tort 
context). 
151. Shaw v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions [1962] A.C. 220, 268 (H.L.). 
152. Almost none is not the same as none. There may be more which talk about public policy 
without naming the doctrine as such. See, e.g., Hasbrouck v. BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 187 F.R.D. 
453, 459, 461 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) ( refusing to order disclosure of a confidential settlement of a harassment 
claim, the court noted that “[w]hile protecting the confidentiality of settlement agreements encourages 
settlement, which is in the public interest, permitting disclosure would discourage settlements, contrary 
to the public interest,” and that “[t]here is a strong public interest in encouraging settlements and in 
promoting the efficient resolution of conflicts”); Gulliver Schs., Inc. v. Snay, 137 So. 3d 1045, 1046, 
1048 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (enforcing clause); Smelkinson Sysco v. Harrell, 875 A.2d 188, 194–95, 
197–99 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (enforcing liquidated damages); Carlini v. Gray Television Grp., Inc., 
No. A-15-1239, 2017 WL 1653624, at *4 (Neb. Ct. App. May 2, 2017) (enforcing provision). But see 
Waterson v. Plank Road Motel Corp., 43 F. Supp. 2d 284, 288 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (permitting disclosure). 
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We undertook a wide-ranging search for all cases of interest without date 
restrictions.153 Only several hundred cases resulted, which probably reflects 
that confidentiality clauses were relatively rarely employed until the mid-
1980s.154 (This temporal fact, incidentally, suggests why the Restatement 
(Second), drafted in the 1960s and 1970s, with an effective date of 1981, is 
so singularly vague and unhelpful).155 
The vast majority of such cases concerned NDAs about trade secrets 
coupled with noncompetition clauses. Many state courts remain suspicious 
of noncompetes, which are thought to restrain competition in violation of 
public policy.156 States are split about whether to be as suspicious of NDAs 
as they are noncompetes, in part because the private harm from the former’s 
breach might be worse.157 Some require geographic or temporal limits on 
NDAs about trade secrets, others do not.158  
The remaining cases defy easy categorization. Before diving in, we will 
note that all courts agree that NDAs which prohibit speech, notwithstanding 
a legal duty to disclose (such as that owed to another named person,159 or to 
public authorities),160 are void. As we discussed above, many states have 
 
153. That is, the cases cited in supra note 152 were full opinions, and were in turn collected by 
Westlaw. In particular, we ran the following search in Westlaw’s All Federal and State cases database: 
“adv: (“public policy” illegal void) /75 ((non-disclosure /3 agree!) OR NDA)”. That resulted in 321 hits, 
which we then read. 
154. See Michelle Dean, Contracts of Silence, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Winter 2018), https:// 
www.cjr.org/special_report/nda-agreement.php/ [https://perma.cc/2UM9-NHCB]; see also Shannon 
Bond & Jane Croft, Non-Disclosure Agreements – An Explainer, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2017), https://w 
ww.ft.com/content/80dcdd58-b893-11e7-9bfb-4a9c83ffa852. 
155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (articulating a 
balancing test for determining whether to enforce a contract when a term is unenforceable on the basis 
of public policy). In Section 178, Subsections 2 and 3 articulate a balancing test, which in the end is 
subsumed into a catchall in Restatement Section 179: “the need to protect some aspect of the public 
welfare.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 179(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) But cf. Alan E. 
Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 347 
(1998) (describing contours of public policy defense to nondisclosure clauses using the Restatement 
factors). 
156. See Buffkin v. Glacier Grp., 997 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (“Post-employment 
restraints are scrutinized with particular care because they are often the product of unequal bargaining 
power and because the employee is likely to give scant attention to the hardship he may later suffer 
through loss of his livelihood” (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 188 cmt. g (1981))). 
157. “Once a secret is disclosed, knowledge of the information cannot normally be confined to a 
particular area.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 41 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1995). 
158. For a lucid discussion of the then case law, see Revere Transducers, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 595 
N.W.2d 751, 761 (Iowa 1999). 
159. See Unami v. Roshan, 659 S.E.2d 724 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (finding unenforceable a 
settlement agreement providing for confidentiality regarding debt where contractual parties had an 
existing contract requiring disclosure of indebtedness). 
160. See Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1061–62 (9th Cir. 2011); 
Fomby-Denson v. Dep’t of the Army, 247 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (settlement NDA unenforceable 
to the extent it prohibited the Army from reporting misconduct to law enforcement); In re JDS Uniphase 
Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (NDA cannot chill employees from 
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additionally passed Sunshine-in-Litigation laws, which in effect make it 
impossible to use NDAs to shield information from discovery or court 
proceedings.161 Putting those aside, how do courts talk about the public 
policy defense against nondisclosure claims? 
A. NDAs and Employer Breach in the Public Interest 
An employee engages in some form of misconduct. Sometimes that 
misconduct is sexual in nature, while at other times it’s a crime. As a part 
of a severance agreement, the parties agree to a confidentiality clause. Later, 
the employer violates that agreement and the employee sues. The employer 
defends, arguing that the confidentiality it agreed to violated public policies. 
What results? 
Public policy defenses to hush contracts sometimes succeed, typically in 
cases with horrific facts. For example, in Picton v. Anderson Union High 
School District, Picton, a history and social studies teacher, was accused of 
raping female students.162 After an investigation, Picton resigned in return 
for a package of financial incentives as well as a mutual NDA.163 Later, the 
school district released information about the charges to the state’s 
Commission on Teacher Credentialing, and Picton sued for breach. The 
court held that because the school district was under a legal duty to inform 
the credentialing commission of facts that led to Picton’s dismissal, the 
nondisclosure clause necessarily violated public policy.164  
Bowman v. Parma Board of Education is similar.165 In Bowman, a 
teacher molested his charges.166 When confronted with the school district’s 
knowledge of that fact, the teacher’s representatives entered into a 
settlement which included a confidentiality clause.167 Later, when a member 
of the school board heard that the teacher was employed elsewhere as a 
teacher, he called that district and disclosed what he knew.168 Nonetheless, 
 
taking part in government investigation); Burkett v. Crulo Trucking Co., Inc., 355 N.E.2d 253, 260–61 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (suggesting that NDA involving partial settlement would be unenforceable, and 
“firing a shot across the bow” to warn future parties). 
161. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 69.081 (2018) (declaring that, in the state of Florida, “no court shall 
enter an order or judgment which has the purpose or effect of concealing a public hazard or any 
information concerning a public hazard, nor shall the court enter an order or judgment which has the 
purpose or effect of concealing any information which may be useful to members of the public in 
protecting themselves from injury which may result from the public hazard”). 
162. Picton v. Anderson Union High Sch. Dist., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
163. Id. at 831. 
164. Id. at 834. 
165. Bowman v. Parma Bd. of Educ., 542 N.E.2d 663 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988). 
166. Id. at 664–65. 
167. Id. at 665. 
168. Id. at 665–66. 
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the second district employed the teacher. The teacher continued his criminal 
behavior and was eventually investigated again, resigned, and entered into 
another settlement agreement.169 
The teacher’s estate sued for violation of the confidentiality agreement. 
Noting that the teacher was “entirely unsuited for the teaching profession,” 
the court went on to hold: 
The only possible conclusion under the circumstance of the instant 
case is that the non-disclosure clause is void and unenforceable and 
no cause of action will lie for its breach.  
[The teacher’s] decision to remain in the teaching profession 
undermines any validity the non-disclosure clause might otherwise 
have possessed. This court will not countenance an action for breach 
of such a clause upon such unchallenged facts as those in the instant 
case, for to do so would be to expose our most vulnerable citizens to 
a completely unacceptable risk of physical, mental and emotional 
harm.170 
The court cited no authorities in this passage. Its view of the risk calculus 
was visceral.171 
Of course, public policy defenses also fail. In Sanchez v. County of San 
Bernardino, a high-level county employee had an affair with the head of the 
sheriff’s deputy union.172 When confronted with this fact, she was advised 
to resign, which she did after she signed a mutual settlement and release 
with a confidentiality clause.173 The county nonetheless released the news 
of her affair and she sued.174 After losing in the trial court on public policy 
grounds, Sanchez prevailed on appeal.175  
The court first noted that unlike other cases, the county was under no 
legal duty to disclose the information to a convening or credentialing 
authority nor had it been requested to disclose.176 It thus considered whether 
the public’s right to know about wrongdoing by public employees could 
trump the “broad, general public policy in favor of privacy.”177 In 
answering that question the court wrote: 
“Historically, th[e California Supreme C]ourt has been reluctant to 
 
169. Id. at 666. 
170. Id. at 666–67. 
171. See also Chappell v. Butterfield-Odin Sch. Dist. No. 836, 673 F. Supp. 2d 818, 829–30 (D. 
Minn. 2009) (holding an agreement not to report teacher to state board of teaching unenforceable).  
172. Sanchez v. Cty. of San Bernardino, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 96, 97 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
173. Id. at 100–01. 
174. Id. at 101–02. 
175. Id. at 98. 
176. Id. at 103–05. 
177. Id. at 104. 
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declare contractual provisions void or unenforceable on public policy 
grounds without firm legislative guidance. . . .” “‘[P]ublic policy’ as 
a concept is notoriously resistant to precise definition, and [ ] courts 
should venture into this area, if at all, with great care and due 
deference to the judgment of the legislative branch, ‘lest they mistake 
their own predilections for public policy which deserves recognition 
at law.’” Thus, in the absence of a statute that required the County to 
make the disclosures that it did, we cannot say that the County’s 
agreement not to make such disclosures violated public policy.178  
Giannecchini v. Hospital of St. Raphael provides another illustration.179 
In the case, a nurse was terminated for serious medication administration 
errors.180 As a part of a negotiated settlement, his former employer agreed 
not to disclose the fact of his involuntary termination to any new 
employer.181 He eventually applied for a new nursing job, and his former 
employer disclosed the underlying facts as a part of a reference check.182 
When sued for breach, the hospital defended itself by alleging a public 
policy defense, which the court rejected.183 As the court explained, the 
agreement in question: 
[M]ay be advantageous to the parties to the contract . . . but the 
contract affects a third interest unrepresented at the bargaining table. 
That interest is the interest of the patient. A patient in a hospital is 
frequently helpless and utterly dependent on the nurses assigned to 
care for him. Any patient in any hospital would surely hope that the 
hospital hiring his nurses would receive full information about any 
medication errors that the nurse had committed in the course of prior 
health care employment. . . . It is no answer to the patient’s legitimate 
concerns that a contract of silence is mutually advantageous between 
the nurse and his former employer. . . . If contractual provisions like 
this are judicially enforceable, some of the most vulnerable citizens 
in our society—patients in hospitals—will inevitably be exposed to a 
risk of physical harm.184 
 
178. Id. (citations omitted) (first quoting Santisas v. Goodin 951 P.2d 399, 413 (Cal. 1998); and 
then quoting Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 543 (Cal. 1999)). 
179. Giannecchini v. Hosp. of St. Raphael, 780 A.2d. 1006 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000). 
180. Id. at 1008. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 1009. 
183. Id. at 1014. 
184. Id. at 1010. 
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Notwithstanding this language, the court upheld the contract, because it 
believed that the legislature had occupied the field by providing a privacy 
right in employment records under certain circumstances. “Unhappily,”185 
the court concluded, the public policy horse had been “saddled by the 
legislature.”186 
B. NDAs and Court-Approved Settlements 
Another important context in which NDAs are tested is in Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA) cases. The FLSA, which regulates largely the 
conditions of hourly work, is typically litigated on a collective basis,187 and 
settlements require court approval.188 Courts “routinely” have found that 
nondisclosure provisions violate public policy because they the inhibit “one 
of the FLSA’s primary goals—to ensure that all workers are aware of their 
rights.”189 At least according to some courts, the public policy attaches by 
virtue of court involvement—the FLSA settlement is filed in court, and 
becomes a “judicial document[],” which then receives a “presumption of 
access.”190  
Courts, however, will go further. Because the “purpose underlying the 
FLSA is the protection of ‘the rights of those who toil,’ . . . the FLSA 
‘should be broadly interpreted and applied.’”191 Even if the settlement is 
available publicly, the “best way for a worker to learn about his or her 
employment rights is directly or indirectly from a co-worker or an outside 
organization.”192  
We note that, in the context of Title VII, while “it is contrary to public 
policy to block communication needed to carry out the purpose of a federal 
 
185. Id. at 1013. 
186. Id. at 1011. 
187. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2018). 
188. See Ronald L. Burdge, Confidentiality in Settlement Agreements Is Bad for Clients, Bad for 
Lawyers, Bad for Justice, AM. B. ASS’N (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/gpsolo/ 
publications/gp_solo/2012/november_december2012privacyandconfidentiality/confidentiality_settlem
ent_agreements_is_bad_clients_lawyers_justice/ [https://perma.cc/3PRP-5J4G] (pointing to the 
congressional intent behind FLSA, one of the nation’s most important labor laws, as the reason behind 
unique disclosure norms and requirements related to FLSA settlements). 
189. Larrea v. FPC Coffees Realty Co., No. 15-CIV-1515 (RA), 2017 WL 1857246, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2017) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Camacho v. Ess-A-Bagel, Inc., No. 14-
cv-2592 (LAK), 2015 WL 129723, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2015)); see also Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake 
House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2015); Martinez v. SJG Foods LLC, No. 16-CV-7890 (RA), 2017 
WL 2169234, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2017). 
190. Lopez v. Nights of Cabiria, LLC, 96 F. Supp. 3d 170, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
191. Poulin v. Gen. Dynamics Shared Res., Inc., No. 3:09-cv-00058, 2010 WL 1257751, at *2 
(W.D. Va. Mar. 26, 2010) (quoting Schultz v. Capital Int’l Sec., Inc., 466 F.3d 298, 304 (4th Cir. 2006)). 
192. Lopez, 96 F. Supp. 3d at 179. 
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act,”193 Title VII has never been so interpreted outside of the context of 
disclosure to public authorities.194  
Thus, in FLSA cases, courts explicitly brush past concerns that 
confidentiality promotes settlement by reducing the likelihood of later 
frivolous litigation.195 This difference is explained by one court as follows: 
“in most contexts such logic is perfectly reasonable. But the congressional 
purposes underlying the FLSA change the calculus.”196 Because Congress 
intended the statute to have an educational purpose, fear of embarrassing 
inquiries is simply seen to be an insufficient reason to permit private control 
over information flows.197  
C. NDAs and Whistleblowers 
A distinct factual context in which sex is at issue is when a private party 
leaks derogatory information to the media in violation of a confidentiality 
agreement and claims that the First Amendment (or its embedded values) 
condones the behavior.198 Such claims are rarely, if ever, successful.199  
A fraught (and difficult) example of the phenomenon is the claim by a 
pro-life organization, the Center for Medical Progress, that it had the right 
to breach a confidentiality clause it had agreed to when it attended the 
National Abortion Federation’s (NAF) Annual Meetings (the NAF is an 
organization of abortion providers).200 When the pro-life organization 
attempted to release secret video recordings of the event (that purported to 
show the NAF’s willingness to sell human tissues among other sins), the 
 
193. Bast, supra note 26, at 655. 
194. Cf. EEOC v. Astra, 94 F.3d 738, 744–45 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding a nondisclosure clause 
which barred EEOC disclosures unenforceable). Though this is not to say courts will not ever expand 
this Title VII doctrine. See, e.g., Netter v. Barnes, 908 F.3d 932, 939 (4th Cir. 2018) (leaving the door 
open for the court to hold that revealing confidential information in violation of a contract between 
private parties is protected under the statute). 
195. Lopez, 96 F. Supp. 3d at 180.  
196. Camacho v. Ess-A-Bagel, Inc., No. 14-cv-2592 (LAK), 2015 WL 129723, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 9, 2015). 
197. An excellent introduction to this topic, which has been cited and followed by many district 
courts, is Wilkins, supra note 31. 
198. M. P. Furmston, The Analysis of Illegal Contracts, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 267, 295 (1965) 
(discussing a case in which a newspaper promised not to disclose a fraud, breached, and was excused 
because of the possibility of harm to third parties). 
199. A typical example tangentially involves Donald Trump. See LiMandri v. Wildman, Harrold, 
Allen & Dixon LLP, No. B234460, 2013 WL 2451322 (Cal. Ct. App. June 6, 2013). 
 There, parties to a confidentiality agreement involving the Miss America competition (that Trump 
owned) breached the agreement but argued that breach was excused because the disclosure was in “a 
public forum in connection with an issue of public interest.” Id. at *4. The court dismissed the argument 
out of hand. Id. at *6. 
200. Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, No. 15-cv-03522-WHO, 2016 WL 454082, 
at *3–5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016). 
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NAF sued for breach of contract and a host of other claims.201 The 
defendants argued that the confidentiality clause violated public policy.202  
In preliminary motion practice, the district court rejected the defendant’s 
arguments.203 It refused to interpret the agreements narrowly in light of the 
defendant’s alleged public-regarding purposes, finding that the NAF’s 
desire for privacy was also justified by public ends.204 In an extended 
passage, the court considered the risk that confidentiality provisions posed 
to First Amendment values.205 Relying on Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,206 
the court noted that disclosure could be compelled if what would otherwise 
be hidden was criminal or especially heinous.207 Given the “significant, 
countervailing public policy arguments weighing in favor of enforcing 
NAF’s confidentiality agreements,” such as harm to providers, the court 
denied the public policy defense to breach.208 
D. NDAs and Adulterers 
Finally, there are a handful of cases where men have agreed to pay for 
the silence of women with whom they have engaged in extra-marital sexual 
relations, typically resulting in a contested claim of paternity. Unlike 
Donald Trump, some of these men have not paid up front for the entirety of 
the counter-promise, and instead sought to declare their obligations excused 
due to public policy—that is, society’s general view that adultery causes 
harm, and that keeping silent about that harm makes things worse.209 
We have not found an example of that argument prevailing in a modern 
case.210 A more typical result is that obtained by former basketball great 
Michael Jordan, who paid a woman with whom he had been intimate 
$250,000 and promised to pay $5,000,000 more if she kept quiet about his 
alleged paternity of a child that had resulted from their affair.211 Though the 
trial court had denied enforcement to any “hush money” agreement,212 the 
 
201. Id. at *4. 
202. Id. at *17.  
203. Id. at *19–21. 
204. Id. at *20. 
205. Id. at *18–19. 
206. 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
207. Nat’l Abortion Fed’n, 2016 WL 454082, at *18. 
208. Id. at *15. 
209. Jordan v. Knafel, 823 N.E.2d 1113, 1121 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
210. Earlier cases often would impose moral values in just this way. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
CONTRACTS § 557 (AM. LAW INST. 1932) (“A Bargain that has for its consideration the nondisclosure 
of discreditable facts . . . is illegal.”). 
211. Jordan, 823 N.E.2d at 1117. 
212. Jordan v. Knafel, No. 02-CH-19143, 2003 WL 25669296, at **9–10 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 12, 
2003). 
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appellate court reversed.213 It held that contracts for silence might be 
unenforceable, if, for example, they “suppress[ed] information . . . about 
public safety.”214 Jordan’s contract was not such a contract; it was, rather, a 
fair exchange in return for a “good-faith claim of right.”215 
III. PUBLIC POLICY AS AN EXTERNALITY PROBLEM 
It is our sense, canvassing the case law, that those few cases considering 
the public policy defense applied to general nondisclosure clauses are 
struggling with two competing intuitions.216 The first is that private bargains 
ought to be respected, and that secrecy, like a price or a warranty term, is 
worthy of deference. This is the idea that appears in Sanchez and like cases: 
finding that the risks of secrecy outweigh the benefits somehow exceeds the 
judicial role.217 The roots of such a pro-bargain principle are deep in contract 
doctrine.218 
The second concern, most evident in the FLSA context, is that secrecy 
creates a unique set of problems when it is attached to the settlement of legal 
rights that have collective attributes.219 Those include the worry that 
silenced parties cannot generate the reputational sanctions that usually make 
private law deterrence-based regimes work.220 There is also a sense that 
giving court imprimatur to confidentiality would makes judges complicit—
that contracts that silence talk about sexual wrongdoing enact a form of 
moral wrong on future potential victims. 
 
213. Jordan, 823 N.E.2d at 1123. 
214. Id. at 1119. 
215. Id. at 1120. The court distinguished In re Yao, 661 N.Y.S.2d 199 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997), 
where an appeals court upheld the finding that an attorney’s contract with a wealthy individual for 
$10,000 a month in return for not publicizing personal information was against public policy. Id. at 
1119–20. 
216. Percy H. Winfield, Public Policy in the English Common Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 76, 77 
(1928) (explaining the role of intuition in public policy analysis). 
217. Sanchez v. Cty. of San Bernardino, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 96, 104 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); see also 
Law and Economics, supra note 26, at 1452 n.35 (noting that courts might be less well-positioned than 
legislatures in thinking about externalities).  
218. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“In 
general, parties may contract as they wish, and courts will enforce their agreements without passing on 
their substance.”). 
219. A goal of public policy is to advance the public “weal” and the “social fabric.” Thomas H. 
Breeze, The Attitude of Public Policy Towards the Contracts of Heirs Expectant and Reversioner, 13 
YALE L.J. 228, 228 (1904). 
220. Cf. Levmore & Fagan, supra note 17, at 322 (noting that sexual harassment cases against 
celebrity defendants might settle for an insufficient amount because the accuser doesn’t know their real 
chances of success given the lack of market signals). 
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Few cases talk about bargaining or consent explicitly, which is 
unsurprising given the doctrine’s particulars.221 Rather, lurking in the 
background of the doctrine, but rarely explicitly discussed, is a search for a 
limiting principle. Courts seem to be asking, if parties can’t contract for 
secrecy here, can they anywhere? What’s the line? How can we make this 
set of rules predictable?222 Thus, courts will cut off their analysis at the hint 
of statutory preemption, and, if they see competing policies (like privacy 
rights) will err on the side of contractual enforcement. 
Like other recent authors, we think that courts should, and sometimes do, 
explicitly focus their analysis on third-party harm.223 Indeed, we think that 
public policy is best thought of as primarily a doctrine about limiting the 
externalities that result from private contracts. The basic intuition is simple: 
private bargains generate benefits to contracting parties while externalizing 
the costs. The owners of Coase’s canonical polluting factory internalize the 
benefits of production while emitting smog (this is the torts classic 
externality, of course). But that factory arises by virtue of a nexus of 
contracts.224 Those external losses will be borne by individuals who can 
rarely bargain with the contracting parties.  
Thus, some have suggested that public policy functions like strict 
liability in tort to force parties to internalize social costs for particular 
bargains.225 Strict liability is typically a doctrine triggered when the 
underlying activity is dangerous, and the consequent social risks are 
extreme. In modern confidentiality cases, courts seem to be grasping at this 
 
221. Cf. Complaint at 12, ¶ 49, Bechard v. Broidy, No. BC-712913 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 6, 2018), 
http://strismaher.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/BC712913-Unredacted-Complaint.pdf [https://perm 
a.cc/9DWP-JQAU] (alleging a survivor was coerced into signing a settlement agreement with 
unconscionable terms by her attorney, who took steps to ensure she would not understand the terms of 
the settlement to which she agreed). The Complaint alleged that  
a review of the Settlement Agreement reveals (1) unconscionable terms to which no reasonable 
lawyer or informed client would agree, as well as (2) terms that Mr. Davidson either 
deliberately refused to disclose to Ms. Bechard or about which he affirmatively lied. For 
example, . . . the Settlement Agreement provides no effective remedy to Ms. Bechard if Mr. 
Broidy violates its confidentiality or payment provisions . . . . In stark contrast, Ms. Bechard 
faces the threat of a preposterously high liquidated damages penalty and resulting financial ruin 
if she has the audacity to mention the Settlement Agreement or respond to Mr. Broidy’s factual 
misstatements. 
Id. ¶ 50 (emphasis omitted). 
222. Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Public Policing of Intimate Agreements, 25 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 159, 208 (2013). 
223. See, e.g., Bagchi, supra note 26, at 212 (proposing an interpretative rule for contracts that 
“[t]extual ambiguity should be resolved to avoid compromising the legally-recognized interests of third 
parties”). 
224. See generally William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical 
Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 407–08 (1989) (advancing a nexus of contracts view that “explains 
corporate relationships and structures in terms of contracting parties and transaction costs”). 
225. Law and Economics, supra note 26, at 1446–47. 
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general principle.226 Both the FLSA courts and Bowman’s solicitude for the 
“most vulnerable” among us evokes the sort of “public danger” rhetoric that 
characterized tort law. What counts as social harm is mutable: as F.H. 
Buckley observes, the third-party focus used to be on the harms caused by 
sexual immorality, but more recent cases worry about commodification and 
racial stereotyping.227  
The analogy between public policy and strict liability breaks down, 
however, when we consider differences in how contract and tort adjudicate 
violations of legal rights. In the strict liability example, tort law says that a 
victim has the right to recover regardless of the tortfeasor’s precaution-
taking.228 The result is that the tortfeasor’s level of activity is, in theory, 
socially optimal: it produces goods so long as its private benefits exceed its 
social costs. The system is efficient, and distributional concerns can be left 
to the tax rules.229  
By contrast, a host of doctrinal rules makes it nearly impossible for third-
party victims of contractual harms to recover from the parties. That’s true 
in part because only those in privity with the contract can usually sue for its 
benefits—the specifically named third-party beneficiaries.230 But it is also 
the case that both parties to a contract are, in essence, jointly responsible for 
harms. It boggles the mind to imagine that other victims in a workplace 
could sue a victim of harassment for a piece of her settlement, as if she had 
received an ill-gotten windfall recovery.231  
Public policy thus is merely a contractual shield, not a sword, and can 
only be used by those internal to the contractual relationship. It is as if the 
only recourse against a polluting factory would be to disable its ability to 
bring a suit against the firm that installed the smokestack. Economically, 
public policy thus does not result in cost internalization by wrongdoers, but 
rather merely reduces the value of the counterparty’s executory promise. 
Further destabilizing the analogy, public policy does not actually 
prohibit the underlying transaction (payment for silence). Rather, it says that 
 
226. See, e.g., Burdge, supra note 188 (explaining that courts have gradually come to view secrecy 
in FLSA cases as per se contrary to public policy given the unique role that statute plays in ensuring 
transparency around work conditions). 
227. Buckley, supra note 26, at 143. 
228. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM ch. 4, scope 
note (AM. LAW INST. 2005). 
229. Stewart Schwab’s analysis of the role of externalities in the wrongful discharge tort is 
illustrative. Schwab, supra note 150, at 1950. 
230. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 133 (AM. LAW INST. 1932) (setting out 
definitions and categories of third-party beneficiary enforceability); see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, 
Third-Party Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. Rev. 1358, 1360–70 (1992) (charting the development of 
American law regarding the enforceability of contracts by third parties). 
231. This would treat contract settlements like disaster funds. 
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you cannot enforce an executory contract for silence in court. Reputational 
sanctions, or private bonds, might promote enforcement of hush contracts 
even if courts were unwilling to enforce them.232 Alternatively, executory 
contracts rendered unenforceable by public policy could become piecework 
deals: a month or two of silence will precede payment, serially, over 
years.233 
What, then, does a public policy defense really gain us if parties can 
avoid it by recourse to a series of contracts? For one, executory contracts 
are cheaper to draft and monitor than an endless series of unenforceable 
micropayments (yes, even in a world of blockchain). Contract law depresses 
the ability of parties to act opportunistically: depriving parties of the right 
to contract in this way will depress their interest in the subject.234 Public 
policy defenses to hush contracts would reduce the number of such 
arrangements in the world—just as, for instance, public policy defenses to 
noncompetes reduce their incidence in states which adhere to the rule (but 
have not eliminated them).235 
Second, public policy defenses are relatively politically attractive. 
Unlike unconscionability, public policy does not require courts to make 
explicit findings about the party’s bargaining deficits before ruling for her 
claims.236 The result is that it is probably easier to adopt politically. Courts 
need not limit the ambit of the defense to the politically unpopular or 
powerless: indeed, many public policy rules (like the ones that prohibit 
liquidated damages clauses if they are penal) are popular in part because 
their benefits are broadly felt. Moreover, because public policy elides 
consent, it similarly avoids the problem that bedevils most contractual 
defenses: the victim needs to show why her contractual choices ought not 
be respected.237 
Third, public policy is self-limiting. Unlike, say, a statute which makes 
every hush contract void, public policy decisions are adopted by common 
 
232. Badawi, supra note 26, at 491. 
233. This pattern of installment payments is exactly what Sanga finds in noncompetes in 
California contracts. Sarath Sanga, Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Approach, 34 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 650, 676–77 (2018).  
234. Badawi, supra note 26, at 492. 
235. Sanga, supra note 233, at 654.  
236. But cf. Jacob Hale Russell, Unconscionability’s Greatly Exaggerated Death, 53 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 15), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=32 
13542 [https://perma.cc/3R3T-FEKD] (finding examples of courts refusing to enforce bad price bargains 
in the absence of procedural unconscionability). 
237. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 IOWA L. REV. 
1745, 1767 (2014); see also Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as the “Law of the 
Poor,” 102 GEO. L.J. 1383, 1422 (2014). 
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law courts in a step-wise, slow, and accretive manner.238 If one court goes 
too far—if, for instance, it turns out that making hush contracts 
unenforceable has perverse consequences for the reporting of harassment at 
work—the next court considering such an agreement can choose again. 
Public policy does not exert the same sort of precedential drag as an ordinary 
opinion; rather, “[a] contract, or a particular provision therein, valid in one 
era may be wholly opposed to the public policy of another.”239 This 
lawlessness is often seen as a bug of the doctrine. But it is also a virtue: 
public policy is flexible and unlikely to do real harm where it has gone 
seriously awry.240 
Fourth, the doctrine is relatively easy to grasp, and will be therefore easy 
to communicate in the news media. This has expressive values (which we 
will discuss below) but it also has a functional role. Much American 
contract law is adjudicated not by judges, but by lawyers acting as 
arbitrators.241 The fidelity of such arbitrators to state law contract doctrine 
is difficult to discern. A clear and publicized rule (“Hush contracts are 
wrong!”) is more likely to succeed in the arbitration black box.  
But these defenses, in the end, do not grapple with the foundational 
problem of scope. Nearly all contracts externalize costs. As Aditi Bagchi 
has explained, a “loose construction of public policy” that protected all 
“legally-recognized third party interests”—would “make adjudication 
unpredictable and inconsistent.”242 It is fair to say that courts today have 
managed to find some sort of solution—only some cases are thrown out 
based on the defense, and few lawyers worry that the ordinary-run 
commercial contract will founder because it creates the risk of financial 
contagion. There seemingly exists a sense shared by lawyers and judges: 
where a contract hides information about physical or severe emotional risks 
from potential victims, who the parties could have easily identified at 
contracting, then it may be voided, especially when it does not seem like the 
disclosing party is acting in bad faith.243 
 
238. Bagchi, supra note 26, at 243.  
239. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 95 (N.J. 1960). 
240. Some might object that once a contract is prohibited under public policy, test cases will not 
arise to change the rule. Not so: consider how many liquidated damages clauses remain in contracts 
despite the historic prohibition, and how the existence of such clauses (and firms’ continued 
experimentation) has changed the law in important states, like California. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1671 (West 
2018) (shifting presumption in California for liquidated damages clauses from invalid to valid). 
241. Issacharoff & Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 27.  
242. Bagchi, supra note 26, at 218. 
243. Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, Danieli Evans, Neal Devins, Eugene Lucci & Katherine 
Cheng, “Ideology” or “Situation Sense”? An Experimental Investigation of Motivated Reasoning and 
Professional Judgement, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 349, 356 (2016). 
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As a matter of moral psychology, this account of public policy looks a 
lot like courts practicing counterfactual thinking. Counterfactual thinking is 
one way that humans assess blame. We are more likely to blame people for 
things they have control over.244 And, the more salient the alternative that 
might have prevented a bad outcome (that is, the easier to imagine it is), the 
more likely we are to believe that it ought to have been prevented. As Tess 
Wilkinson-Ryan has explained, the fact of consent to a contract is a salient 
alternative—if only the parties had not chosen that particular course—
which makes them culpable.245 
And yet, even if courts have muddled through to a doctrine that provides 
relief to identifiable victims, for psychologically compelling reasons, that 
can’t stand as a complete defense of either the status quo or of our 
externality theory of public policy. After all, even if our account provides 
more certainty than the Restatement’s vague balancing engine, we might 
still ask why contract law, rather than tort actions or legislative fiat, is the 
right institutional locus for our intuitions about third-party harm in 
confidentiality proceedings. For that defense, we need to develop a narrative 
of contract law that explains the stories it attempts to tell. 
IV. TOWARDS AN EXPRESSIVE THEORY OF CONTRACT DEFENSES 
In the previous parts, we have developed a mildly richer link between 
public policy and third-party harms than the state of the art. Previous work 
here foundered on the question of remedy, and shied away from arguing that 
externalities should make contracts unenforceable.246 For instance, Aditi 
Bagchi would have courts interpret contracts so as to avoid third-party 
harm,247 but only if they can easily identify it.248 Others, like Adam Badawi, 
would modify the defense by turning it into a limitation on damages: if the 
breaching party can identify a concrete third-party harm, then they need not 
pay the non-breachor.249 
These solutions are elegant, though we are not sure that there is that much 
of a functional difference between interpreting a contract so that it forbids 
third-party harm (or rendering damages unavailable in that case) and simply 
 
244. Neal J. Roese, Counterfactual Thinking, 121 PSYCHOL. BULL. 133, 139 (1997).  
245. Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 237, at 1777–78. 
246. Bagchi, supra note 26, at 241. 
247. See id. at 242.  
248. See id. at 243. 
249. Badawi, supra note 26, at 487. Badawi states that underlying criminal violations will always 
satisfy the test and focuses his analysis on contracts premised on regulatory problems. Id. at 491; see 
also Kostritsky, supra note 26, at 122 (arguing there should be a “graduated relief structure [that] will 
maximize efficient deterrence”). 
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forbidding enforcement ex ante.250 More significantly, a solution that leaves 
public policy to the job of limiting damages, or adding to the canons of 
interpretation, misses an opportunity to fashion a remedy with expressive 
oomph. It would cabin current doctrine but doesn’t really explain the hardest 
cases.251 As Badawi acknowledges, saying that a contract violates public 
policy, but that the parties may nonetheless keep the gains that it created, 
sends the “message that the state tolerates violation of positive law.”252 
In this section, we talk explicitly about the messages that contract law 
sends, with the aim of convincing the reader that when courts believe that 
there is significant third-party harm, they ought to loudly proclaim that 
public policy is violated. We then apply that expressive account of public 
policy to the sexual harassment example. Finally, we deal with a few 
objections. 
A. An Expressive Account of Public Policy in Contract 
Public policy is thought to be incoherent for want of a theory about what 
such a wayward doctrine usefully does within a regime of law dedicated to 
predictability and certainty. To develop such a theory, we will focus on 
contract law’s messaging. That is, we want to situate public policy within 
an expressive account of contract doctrine. In so doing, we hope to show 
that this unruly horse plays an important part in making contract law 
legitimate. 
At “the simplest level, expressive theories posit that, like actions 
generally, legal actions carry meanings and signal attitudes and 
commitments.”253 In other words, jurists should not rest merely on an 
“imperative theory of law”—focused on the commands it issues and 
 
250. Badawi, supra note 26, at 528 (finding this approach indistinguishable from nonenforcement 
in common law cases). 
251. GHODOOSI, supra note 26, at 48 (describing how a law and economics approach misses the 
hardest cases). 
252. Badawi, supra note 26, at 507. Badawi argues that one way to make sense of different 
outcomes in public policy cases is that courts “may place different weights on the expressive harm” that 
enforcement of illegal contracts creates. Id. at 508. As Badawi points out, some courts could reasonably 
think that the “message that it is permissible to violate positive law” might influence both the parties to 
the contract and future parties who face difficult contracting choices. Id. at 509. However, Badawi does 
not extend this account to the expressive function of contract law at a more general level, and his account 
reads as largely within the deterrence tradition. 
253. Jane B. Baron, The Expressive Transparency of Property, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 208, 212 
(2002) (footnotes omitted) (internal quotations omitted) (first quoting Cass R. Sunstein, On the 
Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2021 (1996); and then quoting Cass R. Sunstein, 
Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 925 (1996)). 
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citizens’ expected responses254—but also the messages that those rules 
communicate.255 As Cass Sunstein has explained, sometimes the law ought 
to choose to communicate a message even when it is unsure about what its 
utilitarian effects are: 
A society might identify the kind of valuation to which it is 
committed and insist on that kind, even if the consequences of the 
insistence are obscure or unknown. A society might, for example, 
insist on an antidiscrimination law for expressive reasons even if it 
does not know whether the law actually helps members of minority 
groups. A society might protect endangered species partly because it 
believes that the protection makes best sense of its self-
understanding, by expressing an appropriate valuation of what it 
means for one species to eliminate another. A society might endorse 
or reject capital punishment because it wants to express a certain 
understanding of the appropriate course of action after one person has 
taken the life of another.256 
Expressive accounts of law are not consequence-blind.257 Sunstein 
himself focuses on the relationship between the law’s communicative 
message and the diffusion and evolution of norms.258 But the relationship 
between expressivist theory and its objects can be confused.259 In a modest 
sense, an expressive theory of law is no more than the claim that actions of 
legal officials should be judged by what those actions mean to their 
audiences.260 
Thus, an expressive account of contract law describes the story we tell 
ourselves about the social meaning of legal agreements. In contrast to 
 
254. On imperative theories in law and economics, see Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and 
Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 585 (1998). 
255. Avlana Eisenberg, Expressive Enforcement, 61 UCLA L. REV. 858, 860 (2014). Jonathon 
Penney and Danielle Citron explore this topic as well, and they assert that “law’s expressive value 
extends to victims. It makes clear that the democratic majority disapproves of efforts to silence and 
intimidate victims. It says that the public values victims’ . . . contributions.” Danielle Keats Citron & 
Jonathon W. Penney, When Law Frees Us to Speak, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2317, 2327 (2019). Instead 
of chilling victim speech, they present empirical data showing that strict regulation of harassment online 
actually incentivizes victims to come forward and share their experiences. Id. at 2329–32. 
256. Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 823 
(1994). 
257. There are, however, few empirical accounts. Cf. Maggie Wittlin, Note, Buckling Under 
Pressure: An Empirical Test of the Expressive Effects of Law, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 419 (2011) (finding 
that highly publicized seatbelt laws in one state can affect use in neighboring states). 
258. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2025 (1996). 
259. See Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1363, 1412 n.158 (2000). 
260. See id. at 1384. 
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criminal law,261 constitutional law,262 torts,263 property,264 and even tax,265 
expressive accounts of contract are barely developed. There are, so far as 
we can tell, only a handful of papers that extensively discuss the expressive 
function of contract law writ large.266 
In one paper, experimentalists suggested the specific performance 
default rules could shift individual preferences.267 This is, in essence, an 
argument about the genesis of focal points.268 One way to understand the 
result is as a form of system justification: the subjects see the law as fair, 
but do not know much about it; when informed of the presumed rule, they 
conform their judgment about the system to what they have learned.269  
Another well-known paper, by Gillian Hadfield, suggests that the 
choices made by contracting parties have expressive meaning.270 Her rich 
account responds to purely rational choice theories of contractual consent 
and suggests that courts ought to be careful in mistaking agreement with 
 
261. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 
382–85 (1997); Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 
609, 615–17 (1998); cf. Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 
419–35 (1999) (contrasting deterrence and expressive accounts). 
262. Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General 
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1531–64 (2000). 
263. Alan Strudler, Mass Torts and Moral Principles, 11 L. & PHIL. 297 (1992). 
264. Baron, supra note 253. 
265. Kitty Richards, An Expressive Theory of Tax, 27 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 301 (2017). 
266. Other accounts touching on the role of expression in contract include Tal Kastner, Essay, The 
Persisting Ideal of Agreement in an Age of Boilerplate, 35 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 793 (2010) (providing a 
symbolic account of boilerplate); Roy Kreitner, The Gift Beyond the Grave: Revisiting the Question of 
Consideration, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1876 (2001) (arguing that consideration theory privileges 
individualistic accounts of contract law); Nathan B. Oman, Consent to Retaliation: A Civil Recourse 
Theory of Contractual Lability, 96 IOWA L. REV. 529 (2011) (making the case that contractual rules 
privilege consent to divert social resources from revenge); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, 
Breach Is for Suckers, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1003, 1011 (2010) (explaining that by denying emotional 
damages, contract law depresses the expressive stakes of disputes). 
267. Ben Depoorter & Stephan Tontrup, How Law Frames Moral Intuitions: The Expressive 
Effect of Specific Performance, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 673, 713–15 (2012) (proposing that specific 
performance rules as a default can serve as anchors). 
268. There is a rich experimental and theoretical literature about focal points in default rule 
analysis. Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 
82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 233-35 (2009); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 
86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1651 (2000) (“[L]aw provides a focal point around which individuals can 
coordinate their behavior. When individuals have a common interest in coordinating, as frequently 
occurs, a legal rule may guide behavior merely by influencing expectations about how others will 
behave.”); Richard H. McAdams & Janice Nadler, Coordinating in the Shadow of the Law: Two 
Contextualized Tests of the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance, 42 L. & SOC’Y REV. 865, 887–91 
(2008) (proposing that default rules provide coordinating focal points). 
269. This reading is supported by David A. Hoffman, From Promise to Form: How Contracting 
Online Changes Consumers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1595, 1615–27 (2016) and Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The 
Perverse Consequences of Disclosing Standard Terms, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 117, 121–22 (2017). 
270. Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of Contract: From Feminist Dilemmas to a 
Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in Contract Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1235 (1998). 
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meaningful consent.271 However, Hadfield does not propose a general 
account of how the decisions of contract judges ought to be informed by the 
governmental message they communicate. 
It is not, of course, as if theorists have ignored the message that contract 
law communicates. Ian MacNeil long ago explained that contract law 
functions “as a relatively precise expression—an index if you will—of the 
great underlying and diffuse sea of custom and social practices in which 
human affairs are conducted. This function of law is to tell society what is 
most important among its customs and practices.”272 That is, when courts 
choose to enforce a contract, or pick a particular default rule as the basis for 
bargaining, or adopt a damages limitation, they are in effect sending out a 
message about which (of a competing set of values) our political-legal order 
privileges. 
But a serious complication in developing an expressive account of 
contract doctrine is that—in partial contrast to cognate fields—contract law 
contains within it many values.273 The efficient breach rule propagated in 
canonical cases like Peevyhouse v. Garland tells listeners that contract law 
denies the value of subjective loss, but Groves v. John Wunder Co. makes 
precisely the opposite point.274 Leonard v. Pepsico teaches that contract law 
has a sense of humor; Lucy v. Zehmer calls that idea “bizarre.”275 The 
traditional contracts course ping-pongs between a vision of contract law 
which encompasses social facts and one that focuses on predictability. It is 
no wonder that many students find it exceedingly frustrating.  
However—and noting a legion of exceptions—we see the primary thrust 
of American contract law opinions to be centered around narrowing the 
ambit of mandatory rules and increasing the scope of (and public store of) 
default rules.276 Formation rules like White v. Corlies277 and Nebraska Seed 
 
271. Id. at 1284. 
272. See IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN 
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 94 (1980).  
273. Nathan Oman, Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1488 (2005); 
FREDERICK POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT AT LAW AND IN EQUITY 1 (1881) (acknowledging 
“how special and complex a nature the conception really is”).  
274. Compare Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962), with 
Groves v. John Wunder Co., 286 N.W. 235 (Minn. 1939). 
275. Compare Leonard v. Pepsico, Inc. 88 F. Supp. 2d 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), with Lucy v. Zehmer, 
84 S.E.2d 516, 520 (Va. 1954).  
276. Ayres, supra note 17, at 78–79. 
277. White v. Corlies, 46 N.Y. 467, 469 (1871) (“We understand the rule to be, that where an offer 
is made by one party to another when they are not together, the acceptance of it by that other must be 
manifested by some appropriate act.”). 
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v. Harsh;278 breach rules like Jacob and Youngs, Inc. v. Kent279 and Stewart 
v. Newbury;280 and damages rules like Hadley v. Baxendale,281 Britton v. 
Turner,282 and Hawkins v. McGee283 all explicitly make legal rules with the 
proviso that they can be bargained out of.284 In perhaps the most infamous 
such example, Judge Cardozo in Jacob and Youngs, after crafting a rule 
about substantial performance from the parties’ implied preferences, states 
that “[t]his is not to say that the parties are not free by apt and certain words 
to effectuate a purpose that performance of every term shall be a condition 
of recovery.”285 In other words, the case ultimately expresses a message of 
deference to bargained-for choice.286 
These default rules serve as bargaining focal points.287 Default rules, 
unlike those from torts or criminal law, are uncertain behavioral spurs—
indeed, they are “the weakest kind of law.”288 And, it is not obvious that 
 
278. Neb. Seed Co. v. Harsh, 152 N.W. 310, 311 (Neb. 1915) (“Care should always be taken not 
to construe as an agreement letters which the parties intended only as a preliminary negotiation.” 
(quoting Lyman v. Robinson, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 242, 254 (1867))). 
279. Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 893 (N.Y. 1921) (McLaughlin, J., dissenting) 
(“Having departed from the agreement, if performance has not been waived by the other party, the law 
will not allow him to allege that he has made as good a building as the one he engaged to erect. . . . To 
hold a different doctrine would be simply to make another contract, and would be giving to parties an 
encouragement to violate their engagements, which the just policy of the law does not permit.” (quoting 
Smith v. Brady, 17 N.Y. 173, 186 (1858))). 
280. Stewart v. Newbury, 115 N.E. 984, 985 (N.Y. 1917) (“Where a contract is made to perform 
work and no agreement is made as to payment, the work must be substantially performed before payment 
can be demanded.”). 
281. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 145 (1854) (“Where two parties 
have made a contract, which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive 
in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either 
arising naturally . . . or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both 
parties . . . .”). 
282. Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481, 490–91 (1834) (“If then the party stipulates in the outset to 
receive part performance from time to time, with a knowledge that the whole may not be completed, we 
see no reason why he should not equally be holden to pay for the amount of value received, as where he 
afterwards takes the benefit of what has been done, with a knowledge that the whole which was 
contracted for has not been performed.”). 
283. Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641, 644 (N.H. 1929) (“We therefore conclude that the true 
measure of the plaintiff's damage in the present case is the difference between the value to him of a 
perfect hand or a good hand, such as the jury found the defendant promised him, and the value of his 
hand in its present condition, including any incidental consequences fairly within the contemplation of 
the parties when they made their contract.”).  
284. See, e.g., Jacob & Youngs, 129 N.E. at 891; see also Hadley, 9 Exch. at 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 
at 145 (observing that contracting parties can stipulate damage provisions but that in the absence of such 
provisions, default rules will apply). 
285. Jacob & Youngs, 129 N.E. at 891. The rule is “infamous” because it is not obvious that 
Cardozo meant to take it literally rather than seriously. 
286. Kreitner, supra note 266, at 1953–56 (describing consideration theory as having the effect of 
advancing a conception of a “calculating individual”). 
287. See supra note 268. 
288. McAdams & Nadler, supra note 268, at 886.  
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such rules intend, or succeed, at altering primary behavior in the world.289 
Thus, utilitarian and incentive theories of contract law constantly must 
struggle with the inconvenient fact that contract doctrine is behaviorally 
flimsy. 
What the default rule project does best is to express a message: our 
society values autonomy more than contractual fairness.290 Thus, a central 
organizing metaphor of contract law—the hypothetical bargain which 
generates both consideration doctrine and default rule analysis—is explicit 
in denying the validity of external brakes on what the parties agree to. 
Default rules are generally majoritarian: what matters is what most parties 
would have wanted.291  
Working through the exceptions to this rule is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but we think in general descriptive terms it ought to be 
uncontroversial. Contract law shouts choice to the rooftops and it holds 
consent up as the ideal against which decisions are to be measured. Thus, 
theorists who work to cabin the scope of choice are not in the heartland of 
contract doctrine but rather are “feminists” or “paternalists.”292 Those who 
would upturn parties’ choices must reckon with the cost: better terms = 
higher price.293 Unconscionability, good faith, the pre-existing duty rule, 
 
289. David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 
89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1836–37 (1991) (discussing how default choosing may be done so as to create 
social expectations); Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its 
Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1054–56 (2004) (describing the limits of default rules in trusts and 
estates to influence behavior); Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract 
Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 389, 414 (1993) (“[P]ersons are unlikely to abandon considered views 
merely because the state enacts a nonbinding rule that these persons think is objectionable.”). 
290. See Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 
1014 (1985) (“[O]ur principal vision of contract law is still one of a neutral facilitator of private volition. 
We understand that contract law is concerned at the periphery with the imposition of social duties . . . . 
But we conceive the central arena to be an unproblematic enforcement of obligations voluntarily 
undertaken. . . . Although we concede that the law of contract is the result of public decisions about what 
agreements to enforce, we insist that the overarching public decision is to respect and enforce private 
intention.”). 
291. Charny, supra note 289, at 1815 (explaining that the trend is toward majoritarian default rule 
analysis). 
292. Gillian K. Hadfield, The Dilemma of Choice: A Feminist Perspective on the Limits of 
Freedom of Contract, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 337 (1995); Hadfield, supra note 270; Robin West, 
Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz 
Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985); cf. David Campbell, Afterword: Feminism, 
Liberalism and Utopianism in the Analysis of Contracting, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON CONTRACT 
LAW 161, 165, 172 (Linda Mulcahy & Sally Wheeler eds., 2005) (criticizing Hadfield and arguing that 
if authors “do not place a pre-eminent value on autonomy, feminists cannot really respect the law of 
contract, for a law of contract that does not turn on autonomy and choice becomes something like a law 
of planned, paternalistic exchanges, that is, not contract at all”). 
293. Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related 
Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 29 (1993). 
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and duress are limited “exceptions” to the mainstream of modern contract 
law, and must be justified, cabined, and explained away.  
This division between the core and periphery of contract law is, at its 
root, one founded on a vision of a society of equals, bargaining together, 
and capable of protecting themselves. Contract cases which adopt default 
rules express a message—a story of the triumph of the will. The expressive 
story of contract law marks us all as agents capable of choice, members of 
a community with shared linguistic and social conventions, and 
consequently citizens. 
Those who seek to be freed from obligation are put in a bind. They cannot 
usually argue that they consented but that the rule is unfair.294 Doing so 
would be akin to claiming that they are not like other citizens—worthy of 
losing to an equal foe. Rather, those advancing such defenses must find a 
way to convince the court that their consent was not freely obtained, or their 
choice otherwise unworthy of deference. Since most of the time, consent in 
contract law is shallow, many defenses to obligation are losers.295  
Public policy offers a notable counter narrative. Here judges indulge the 
view that consent is less important than social welfare, and that, therefore, 
the parties’ choices are more-or-less irrelevant to the question of whether 
those choices should receive a public backing.296 They do so, moreover, 
explicitly without reference to the tropes of predictability and planning that 
undergird the consent narrative in other parts of contract doctrine, and with 
an emphasis on the external consequences that the parties’ choices create. 
In effect, public policy is a form of contract law anti-matter. Rather than 
emphasizing private life, it chooses social values; rather than predictability, 
it trumpets the virtues of flexibility; rather than precedent, it looks to the 
needs of the moment.  
Contract law and its makers profit by celebrating heterodoxy. Doing so 
may make commentators and members of the public feel better about the 
mine-run of decisions: they entrench the view that contract cases produce 
outcomes that are the product of considered judgment. Hot cases can be 
casebook staples, making future lawyers more likely to see doctrine as 
 
294. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(explaining that consideration is not evaluated for fairness and only rarely is contract formation held 
unconscionable). 
295. See Chunlin Leonhard, The Unbearable Lightness of Consent in Contract Law, 63 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 57, 60 (2012) (“Contract law’s consent focus is increasingly problematic due to multiple 
factors. To begin with, consent is an amorphous, difficult-to-define concept that is made increasingly 
more difficult by the marketplace manipulations of human decision making biases.”); see also DON 
HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY 247 (1989) (“We use consent theory not 
as a map, not realizing that like any other map it’s simpler than reality, but as a set of blinders or rose-
colored glasses that make the world look clearer, less problematic, than it really is.”). 
296. Matsumura, supra note 222, at 199 (by denying enforcement, courts show their values). 
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containing the potential for social change, and thus accepting of the normal 
science of contract law.297 By acting as a safety valve, public policy 
doctrine, like unconscionability, makes doctrine more sociologically 
legitimate.298 
As it turns out, shoring up individuals’ views about contracting is an 
urgent social task. The sort of contract encountered daily by citizens—the 
click-to-agree license—threatens to erode our widely shared view that 
contracting is a practice that has social utility. Parties, who must agree to an 
explicit lie every time they consent online (affirming that you have read the 
contract’s terms),299 deal with faceless corporate counterparties who see 
them as a piece of data to be sold.300 The result: contracts are increasingly 
the subject of satire.301 And, as recent experimental evidence has shown, 
millennial consumers, who have experienced more digital contracting than 
the rest of us, have distinct views of what contracting means. They are more 
likely to think that contract law is formal and does not permit excuses for 
breach, more likely to breach themselves, and are generally more likely to 
“chisel and push and shop around whenever possible, because ‘contracts’ 
are nothing but formal terms that stand in the way of consumption.”302 
 
297. See Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 591, 594 (1982) (“The first step toward this sense of the irrelevance of liberal or left thinking is 
the opposition in the first-year curriculum between the technical, boring, difficult, obscure legal case, 
and the occasional case with outrageous facts and a piggish judicial opinion endorsing or tolerating the 
outrage.”). 
298. See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 237, at 1422 (describing how a district court’s signaling of the 
unconscionability of a contract involving a low-income individual catalyzed a broader legislative fix, 
thereby legitimizing government as responsive to the needs of the most vulnerable). 
299.  See South Park: HumancentiPad (Comedy Central television broadcast Apr. 27, 2011), http:/ 
/www.hulu.com/watch/249969 [https://perma.cc/2YR2-DNEZ].  
Guard:  You can’t agree by accident. There’s a fail-safe built in. Even if you click on ‘Agree’ 
another little window pops up that says, ‘Are you sure you agree?’ and you have to click on 
‘Agree’ again. 
Woman:  Uh, what are you going to do to us? 
Guard:  Everything that you agreed to in the iTunes conditions. 
Kyle:  We didn’t read them! 
Guard:  Heh! Right. Who just agrees to something they don’t read? 
Id. 
300.  For evidence that contracts with firms are more likely to be seen as morally inert than 
contracts with individuals, see Uriel Haran, A Person-Organization Discontinuity in Contract 
Perception: Why Corporations Can Get Away with Breaking Contracts But Individuals Cannot, 59 
MGMT. SCI. 2837, 2850–51 (2013). 
301.  See, e.g., Nation Shudders at Large Block of Uninterrupted Text, ONION (Mar. 9, 2010, 5:00 
PM), http://www.theonion.com/article/nation-shudders-at-large-block-of-uninterrupted-te-16932 [https 
://per ma.cc/5NAL-2R92] (“Some have speculated that the never-ending flood of sentences may be a 
news article, medical study, urgent product recall notice, letter, user agreement, or even a binding 
contract of some kind.”). 
302. Hoffman, supra note 269, at 1598. 
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On net, the loss of a shared sense of contract’s moral weight is a bad 
thing. As one of us has previously explored: 
Imagining contract doctrine operating on a landscape where its 
subjects think contracts are forms exposes just how deeply contract 
theory needs citizens to view contracts as moral promises. In classical 
and economic contract theory, legal rules provide the primary 
behavioral spur—toward or against precaution, formation, and 
contract. For example, our damage-centered remedial regime 
undercompensates breach, and economists have long suggested that 
it consequently motivates it. But relational theorists, and more 
recently behavioralists, have taught us differently: Both moral and 
reputational norms constrain opportunistic behavior. Thus, we can 
undercompensate breach, only loosely guard against exploitation, 
weakly hold parties together, and not give parties the remedies they 
seek, because parties have moral intuitions about contract, and 
consequent reputational concerns, that constrain breach and make it 
abnormal.
303
 
We suggest that a vibrant public policy doctrine, built around solicitude 
for third-party harm, could alleviate the trend that we see toward amoral 
contracting. Experimental evidence does, in fact, suggest that individuals’ 
views of contract law’s distributive preferences are labile.304 What is 
necessary is a way to shock the audience into a new understanding of what 
contract doctrine is aspiring to—to make them aware that there is a counter-
story to the narrative of click-to-consent, and a sense that contract cases are 
infused with concern for social welfare. 
Though we normally think of statutory law as the repository of societal 
expressions of shared values, common law contract cases may be better 
suited to this particular task than the legislature, precisely because public 
policy is rare, salient, and premised on explicitly moral judgments. Though 
courts routinely engage in political compromises, the public retains trust in 
the judiciary and generally believe courts are ideologically balanced.305 This 
should be particularly true when courts go against the normal current, 
denying the importance of consent and emphasizing the importance of risk 
 
303. See id. at 1633 (footnotes omitted). 
304. See id. at 1611–31; Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 237, at 1778. 
305. TOPICS: SUPREME COURT, GALLUP (2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/4732/supreme-
court.aspx [https://perma.cc/SN9Y-SANZ]; Jeffrey M. Jones, Trust in Judicial Branch Up, Executive 
Branch Down, GALLUP (Sept. 20, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/poll/219674/trust-judicial-branch-
executive-branch-down.aspx [https://perma.cc/5BG3-UPSQ]; Harry J. Enten, What Americans Think of 
the Supreme Court, GUARDIAN (June 27, 2012, 6:14 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree 
/2012/jun/27/what-americans-think-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/DG53-DKCD]. 
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and vulnerable populations. Indeed, the cases that we discussed above all 
had the flavor of a public speech, focusing on the urgent risks posed by 
enforcement, and the selfishness of the contracting parties in seeking to 
amass private gains.306 They were designed for social media consumption.  
Thus, we would urge courts to understand public policy defenses not as 
an undermining of the freedom to contract but rather an expressive shoring 
up of the entire contractual foundation. Judges should disaffirm bargains 
that threaten third-party harm, and they should do so loudly. The result is 
consistent with how public policy has worked historically in nondisclosure 
cases. It is, more importantly, necessary to break through an increasingly 
shared skepticism about the moral bases for contractual enforcement that 
threatens private ordering more generally. 
B. Application to Hush Contracts 
As we have shown, public policy decisions which refuse to enforce hush 
agreements on the grounds that they create severe third-party harm ought to 
be attractive to contract jurists. That is so even though line-drawing 
problems will be rife, and there is a possibility that courts will chill the 
market in sexual harassment settlements and consequently deprive some 
victims of any practical remedy.307  
To better motivate our proposal, we would now return to our introduction 
and offer some guiding thoughts to jurists on particular types of 
nondisclosure settlements. Our thoughts are necessarily tentative, because 
the public record is itself sparse on the details. However, we can begin with 
the easy case: enforcing the Maroney Hush Agreement. In that agreement, 
as you will recall, USA Gymnastics bought the silence of one of its athletes 
about its possible complicity with Larry Nassar’s criminal conduct.308 
USAG had approached Maroney in late 2016, just as allegations against 
Nassar had begun to emerge.309 Fines for violation of this nondisclosure 
 
306. See infra Part II.A (cataloguing the NDA cases we examined). 
307. After the recent passage of California’s law prohibiting most types of hush contracts, 
practitioners indeed noted the potential for chilling settlements. As one defense practitioner added, 
“California employers should consider this new law when deciding whether to settle matters. Factual 
information surrounding allegations of sexual harassment, discrimination, and retaliation will no longer 
remain confidential, resulting in a greater reputational risk to even the best-run companies.” Kristi 
Thomas, New California Law Puts an End to Secret Sexual Harassment Settlements, SHEPPARD 
MULLIN: LAB. & EMP. L. BLOG (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.laboremploymentlawblog.com/2018/10/arti 
cles/sexual-harassment/ca-ends-non-disclosure-settlements/ [https://perma.cc/92ZD-7ZAQ]. 
308. Maroney Complaint, supra note 2, at 53, ¶ 191–92. 
309. John Barr, Confidentiality Agreement Kept McKayla Maroney from Revealing Abuse, ESPN 
(Dec. 20, 2017), http://www.espn.com/olympics/gymnastics/story/_/id/21825575/usa-gymnastics-struc 
k-agreement-mckayla-maroney-keep-larry-nassar-abuse-quiet-lawyer-says [https://perma.cc/LU29-YP 
JL]. 
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clause—alleged to have been one of several entered into by the 
association310—were eventually waived by the association after substantial 
public outcry.311 
Under our frame, this presents an easy case for nonenforcement. The 
harm—to third parties—is severe, as it involves an ongoing pattern of 
criminal assaults on minors, which had not been fully revealed at the time 
of the case. Indeed, Maroney’s case alleged that the settlement’s goal was 
to “conceal and shield from public scrutiny, outside investigation, and law 
enforcement, the true nature of NASSAR's horrific sexual abuse of minors,” 
and enable “NASSAR to quietly leave [USA Gymnastics]; further silencing 
his victims.”312 
Moreover, the benefit to the court system for rejecting hush contracts in 
such publicized settings is evident: it would express a message that 
contracting to silence about horrific behavior simply is not consonant with 
our values. Finally, given that California’s law was amended after the 
agreement’s formation to prohibit its precise scope,313 courts would feel 
comfortable knowing they were not reaching beyond the statutory rule in 
making policy.314 
Zelda Perkins’ case is, we think, similarly straightforward under our 
theory. Unlike some who are concerned with the incentive effects of hush 
contracts with famous men, we are not persuaded that making executory 
settlements about sexual harassment unenforceable will necessarily have 
much of an effect in the private market for silence.315 What it will do is 
disassociate contract doctrine with spiraling violence on women that hush 
contracts enable, and state (clearly) that the harms of sexual harassment are 
social, not merely personal to individual parties.  
Courts should simply refuse, as a matter of public policy, to enforce a 
contract which calls for the victim of sexual harassment to stay silent, just 
as they would refuse to permit that condition to remain in a FLSA 
 
310. Amanda Turner, Manly: USAG Lied to Congress on Non-Disclosure Agreements, INT’L 
GYMNAST MAG. ONLINE (Feb. 13, 2018, 10:17 PM), http://www.intlgymnast.com/index.php?option=co 
m_content&view=article&id=5013:manly-usag-lied-to-congress-on-non-disclosure-agreements&catid 
=2:news&Itemid=53 [https://perma.cc/4V6N-CH95]. 
311. See Tucker, supra note 4.  
312. Maroney Complaint, supra note 2, at 28, ¶ 73. 
313. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1002(a)(1)–(4) (West 2017); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6500 (West 
2017) (setting the age of majority at eighteen in California); see also Maroney Complaint, supra note 2, 
at 27–28. 
314. See Globe Newspaper Co., Inc. v. Clerk of Suffolk Cty. Super. Ct., 14 Mass. L. Rptr. 315, 
320 (Mass. Supp. 2002) (holding “sexual abuse of children by members of the clergy is . . . a matter of 
immense public concern and of enormous community interest,” and adding that the public has a valid 
interest in knowing which members of the clergy have been accused of sexual abuse). 
315. Levmore & Fagan, supra note 17, at 314–15. 
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settlement.316 Because, as we argued above, the costs to non-signatories of 
sexual harassment settlements are enormous but diffuse, sexual harassment 
presents a classic case where public policy should act to reduce the 
externalization of social harm and the taking of particular private benefits.  
Finally, we come to the case of President Trump’s purchasing of the 
silence of his sexual partners.317 Unlike the prior examples, the underlying 
conduct does not create a clear class of particular future victims: there was 
no allegation in the complaints we have seen that Trump’s attentions were 
unwanted, or that he sought to cover up physical violence or aggression, 
though the power dynamics in his extra-marital relationships were 
complicated.318 Further, although enforcing such contracts might occasion 
social harm—the loss of relevant information about a presidential 
candidate—the candidate’s countervailing privacy interests would seem to 
weigh a bit more heavily here.  
Thus, although there is a strong political and moral case for preventing 
presidential candidates from using contract law to keep information from 
the public, the public policy case is sufficiently weak that we are not 
comfortable recommending that courts advance the defense, not least 
because of the danger that any decision will be read in a partisan light. To 
the extent that rules against such settlements should be made, we would 
argue that they ought to be set out prophylactically, in neutral statutes, 
created by legislatures. 
As this typology shows, a public policy defense to hush contracts would 
have real bite in the set of contracts that is of primary interest in the world: 
hush contracts about sexual harassment incidents in the workplace. Outside 
of California, such contracts are largely enforceable today, and they would 
be episodically unenforceable if our theory were to be widely taken up. We 
think that the result would be to unshackle victims of sexual violence from 
agreements that silence them and to promote equality in the workplace and 
beyond. 
C. A Few Obvious Objections 
We have already argued that making executory hush contracts 
unenforceable on public policy grounds will, net-net, have uncertain effects 
 
316. See infra Part II.B (discussing courts’ application of the public policy doctrine in the context 
of court-approved FLSA settlements). 
317. See, e.g., infra Introduction (identifying President Trump’s use of a hushing contract to 
prevent a former sexual partner, Ms. Clifford, from speaking publicly about their relationship). 
318. The case of his divorce is different. Jane Mayer, Documenting Trump’s Abuse of Women, 
NEW YORKER (Oct. 17, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/10/24/documenting-trumps 
-abuse-of-women [https://perma.cc/X6B8-CZGX]. 
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on the ability of victims of misconduct to extract compensatory 
settlements.319 Putting that strong objection to our proposal to one side, what 
other arguments might defenders of the status quo make against public 
policy’s expansion? 
In the end, the best response starts with institutional choice. Judges are 
ill-equipped to make the nice distinctions between really malignant 
externalities and those ordinary third-party losses that accompany most 
contracts. Because we generally think that empirically-based policy ought 
to be accomplished through democratically accountable means, we too 
worry that public policy would threaten to leave the wrong sort of decision 
with courts.320 We applaud California’s recent legislative efforts in this 
area.321 However, we would also note that contract law decisions advancing 
progressive goals tend to result in legislative responses. As Anne Fleming 
has shown, early decisions on unconscionability had the effect of producing 
a series of laws that in effect carved consumer protection out of contract 
law.322 Thus, courts do not preempt legislatures: they provoke them. 
Second, we return to the problem of scope. In a sense, our argument is 
potentially too widely ranging. Though we believe that sexual harassment 
NDAs provide a particularly salient example of the problem of external 
harm warranting public policy brakes, we do not think that the defense 
should be limited to this particular context. To the extent that all contracts 
entail harm to third parties, known or unknown, and to the extent that all 
contract cases set up the possibility of expressive judging, have we not 
created the possibility of a truly destabilizing doctrine? 
One answer to this concern, as we have just suggested, is that more 
expansive defenses will push legislative action, and that to the extent that 
public policy creeps outside of the hush contract disclosure context, the 
legislature will intervene. Second, as we have alluded to, common law 
contract defenses are inherently self-limiting. Courts are conventionally 
cautious in finding exceptions to consented liability, and there are many 
reasons to think—based on the caselaw we have studied—that they will 
look for particularly concrete, visceral, and foreseeable harms before 
accepting public policy defenses. Moreover, to the extent that they over-
deter formation, they can relatively easily retreat from the abyss by cutting 
back on the defense’s application. 
These realistic limitations are convenient, but as responses they are 
 
319. See generally infra Part I.B (identifying the benefits of enforcing hushing agreements—in 
particular, the ability of motivated plaintiffs to receive payments in exchange for their silence). 
320. Schwab, supra note 150, at 1957–58 (suggesting that courts avoid the public policy tort by 
shifting the analysis to legislative enactments). 
321. 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 953 (S.B. 820) (West) (codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1001 
(West 2018)). 
322. Fleming, supra note 237.  
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perhaps a bit pat. It is true that in theory a public policy defense triggered 
by external harm and the potential for a highly publicized expressive 
opinion might seem like a public policy defense to almost all agreements. 
We concede the point, though we believe that in practice lawyers and judges 
share a situation sense of the meaning of “external harm” that, however 
difficult to define, is coherent, and a view about the appropriateness of 
expressive messaging that is similarly restrained.323  
Finally, we would be remiss if we did not return to the problem of 
arbitration. The last two decades have seen an explosion of arbitration in 
contract cases, and a consequent disappearance of caselaw on important 
contract topics, ranging from formation to defenses of enforcement.324 
Given these trends, any normative account of contract doctrine needs to at 
least consider how proposed changes will filter through into the arbitral 
tribunal, and what that mode of enforcement means for the proposed legal 
rule. 
One of the advantages of a public policy rule for hush contracts is that it 
is highly salient and easy to understand: courts would broadcast that 
particular classes of contract offend public policy. Unlike the 
“reasonableness” tests that mark formation doctrines, or the multi-factor 
materiality standard that guides breach rules, simple public policy standards 
might be easier for arbitrators to apply, and thus more likely to be actually 
taken up in practice. This is the general pattern we see in the analogous 
situation in California, where arbitrators are obligated to rule against non-
competes.325 
However, we must confess a weakness in our claim. We are not sure that 
legal rules that explicitly call for the adjudicator to involve themselves in 
social policy fare equally well in the arbitral process. They probably do not, 
as arbitrators face incentive structures to not depart from the parties’ settled 
expectations, and are not rewarded, reputationally or otherwise, for issuing 
public-facing rulings.326 Thus, readers should understand that whatever the 
content of a state’s public policy doctrine, it will be muted if the parties have 
agreed to arbitration.327 Nonetheless, many hush contracts—even those 
 
323. Kahan, Hoffman, Evans, Devins, Lucci & Cheng, supra note 243, at 354–56. 
324. Issacharoff & Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 27, at 4.  
325. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 925(d) (West 2017) (“For purposes of this section, adjudication 
includes litigation and arbitration.”). 
326. See, e.g., Dean B. Thomson & Jesse R. Orman, Inside the “Black Box”: The Preferences, 
Practices, and Rule Interpretations of Construction Arbitrators, 12 J. AM. C. CONSTRUCTION LAW. 37, 
74–75 (2018) (few arbitrators would admit to making free-floating policy judgments).  
327. Labor arbitration might be an exception. Generally, labor arbitration is distinct from 
employment arbitration proceedings in that it applies specifically to employees covered under collective 
bargaining agreements. “In the union context, arbitration is designed to resolve disputes as a substitute 
for economic pressure in the form of strikes or lockouts.” Barry Winograd, Employment Arbitration–A 
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containing mandatory arbitration clauses—will actually contain a carve-out 
permitting court enforcement as a way of achieving specific performance, 
and any attempt by parties to obtain these injunctions would be hard to 
achieve before a judge.328 
Even if arbitrators were to adopt public policy defenses, the expressive 
content of their decisions would either be entirely lost (because the 
proceedings are ordinarily secret) or difficult to attribute to the state 
(because a “court” would not be making the ruling). This precise 
argument—that arbitration does not fully vindicate public rights because it 
strips from the public’s tribunals the right to express social sanctions—is 
one that the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected as an argument against 
the Federal Aribtration Act (FAA).329 But it remains descriptively correct: 
arbitrators cannot (and do not) express the public’s view about what counts 
as good and bad behavior in the way that a judge can. Thus, public policy 
has little expressive power outside of public tribunals. 
The net result is that to the extent that arbitration’s dominion over 
contract adjudication grows, both the practical and expressive import of our 
proposal will diminish. This, of course, reduces the stakes of adopting our 
position. But that is not a particularly compelling affirmative claim. If, in 
reality, most proposals to change contract doctrine end up being about the 
rare litigated case, one might fairly wonder why one ought to bother at all. 
We offer two responses. First, of course, arbitration’s ascendency is a 
recent trend, and might change. Forced arbitration is an increasingly salient 
political issue.330 Democratic politicians increasingly seem to be pushing a 
partial or total repeal of the FAA,331 and a different constellation of justices 
on an ever-changing Supreme Court could have a different view of the 
merits of FAA preemption.332 Scholars ought to arm courts with new 
 
Primer, ARB. INFO: NAT’L ACAD. ARB. & U. MO. SCH. L. (June 20, 2016), http://law.missouri.edu/ 
arbitrationinfo/2016/06/20/employment-arbitration-a-primer [https://perma.cc/3M5J-NFWX]. 
328. See Christoper R. Drahozal & Erin O’Hara O’Connor, Unbundling Procedure: Carve-Outs 
from Arbitration Clauses, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1945, 1994 (2014) (“[S]ophisticated parties seem to prefer 
specific performance as the most effective means to protect the value of their exchange. A recent 
empirical study conducted by Eisenberg and Miller showed that contracting parties commonly 
incorporate into their documents language designed to enhance the likelihood of obtaining an order for 
specific performance in the event of breach.”). 
329. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 235 (2013); Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 
138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018). 
330. So much so, in fact, that sitting Commissioners on the Federal Trade Commission are making 
public statements about the practice’s potential harm to consumers. See Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, 
Opinion, You Should Have the Right to Sue Apple, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.co 
m/2018/12/12/opinion/apple-pepper-antitrust-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/FRU2-4P6S]. 
331. Restoring Justice for Workers Act, H.R. 7109, 115th Cong. (2018).  
332. See Luke P. Norris, The Parity Principle, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 249, 316 (2018) (identifying 
within the FAA, Section 1 a “parity principle,” signaling “recognition by Congress of how economic 
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doctrinal approaches in the event that they once again are given the chance 
to resolve cases. 
Second, to the extent that a particular rule is firmly fixed in the 
courthouse, it should have weight even if it will be rarely exercised. 
Arbitration decisions require court enforcement if parties are unwilling to 
pay: a court might well conclude that an arbitral proceeding enforcing a 
hush agreement was manifestly wrong, and thus unenforceable.333 Or, 
lawyers might be dissuaded from putting such agreements into contracts for 
fear of social or professional sanctions.334 The result would be that public 
policy’s defense against hush contracts should be hard to entirely contain 
within arbitration.  
CONCLUSION 
In his 2007 article on Open Secrets, Malcolm Gladwell explored the 
origin story of Enron’s decline into bankruptcy.335 He noted various stages 
along the way where the writing on the wall was not only present but 
prominently so.336 That the company was engaging in less than savory 
business practices was, for all intents and purposes, an open secret.337 
Gladwell offers a novel way of understanding the difference between this 
set of affairs and, as an example, the fact that no one at the time of 
 
power disparities could infect privatized process and a regulatory commitment to ensuring public 
process where such disparities existed in order to ensure the social welfare of workers”). 
333. Cf. Application Grp., Inc. v. Hunter Grp., Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73, 85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) 
(upholding Section 16600 of the California Business and Professions Code, which prohibits the 
enforcement of noncompetes, as “reflect[ing] a strong public policy of the State of California” (internal 
quotation omitted) (quoting KGB, Inc. v. Giannoulas, 164 Cal. Rptr. 571, 577 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980))); 
see also Advanced Bionics Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 59 P.3d 231, 237 (Cal. 2002) (“California has a 
strong interest in protecting its employees from noncompetition agreements . . . .”). 
334. See Jon Bauer, Buying Witness Silence: Evidence-Suppressing Settlements and Lawyers’ 
Ethics, 87 OR. L. REV. 481, 566–72 (2008) (suggesting that drafting settlement agreements that suppress 
evidence of wrongdoing which may recur is against lawyers’ professional responsibilities); see also 
COWORKER.ORG, Harvard Law School Students Speak Out Against ‘Coercive’ Employment Contracts, 
MEDIUM (Nov. 20, 2018), https://medium.com/@TeamCoworker/harvard-law-school-students-speak-o 
ut-against-coercive-employment-contracts-6907b2d7f33a [https://perma.cc/BY7H-HCHH] (profiling a 
campaign launched by law students to strip law firms of their ability to enforce arbitration claims against 
attorneys and suggesting law firms may be more susceptible to accountability actions than previously 
assumed). 
335. Malcolm Gladwell, Open Secrets: Enron, Intelligence, and the Perils of Too Much 
Information, NEW YORKER, Jan. 8, 2007, at 44, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/01/08/ 
open-secrets-3 [https://perma.cc/S5FJ-79WC]. 
336. So much so, in fact, that Cornell students identified the crux of the underlying problem as 
part of a group project in 1998, based on public data the students found that “Enron was pursuing a far 
riskier strategy than its competitors,” and that “[t]here were clear signs that Enron may be manipulating 
its earnings.” See id. at 53 (internal quotation omitted). 
337. Indeed, all that was required for Enron to be found out was for investigative reporters to read 
through publicly-available tax filings. See id. at 52.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
220 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [VOL. 97:165 
 
 
 
publication knew where Osama Bin Laden was hiding. Whereas the former 
was a mystery (where “the hard part is not that we have too little information 
but that we have too much”), the latter was a puzzle (where we simply do 
not have the information we need).338 To Gladwell, the struggle for 
increasingly complex organizations wishing to remain afloat is how to 
manage information to effectively resolve mysteries before they tank the 
ship. 
Like others who have been struggling with the #MeToo movement, we 
think that sexual harassment at work is an open secret339—one that critically 
undermines the efficiency of the workplace340—while threatening the well-
being of its workers. And, given what we learned (or failed to learn) in the 
2016 election, open secrets can have consequences for the body politic. Our 
proposal offers courts a methodology by which to make secrets at work less 
poisonous. 
What is to be done? We have argued that courts should generally refuse 
to enforce contracts which create particularly egregious third-party harms. 
As a case study, we turned to hush contracts, arguing that, especially when 
created by organizations who are blinding unpaid third parties to abusers, 
such contracts violate public policy. We further have claimed that recent 
controversies about such nondisclosure clauses provided jurists a 
generational teaching moment in just what it means to enter into a legally-
enforceable contractual relationship. Private control may be the touchstone 
of contractual obligation, but it is equally foundational that law does not 
sanction all promises. Hush contracts should be silenced, so that contract 
law can find its voice. 
 
338. See id. at 44.  
339. See, e.g., An Open Secret: Sexual Harassment at Work, ECONOMIST (Oct. 21, 2017), https://w 
ww.economist.com/international/2017/10/21/sexual-harassment-at-work [https://perma.cc/9S7R-QW8 
A].  
340. In fact, studies of the U.S. government’s classification regimes illustrate the ways keeping 
excessive secrets and sequestering information in different corners of an organizational apparatus in fact 
inhibits effective coordination between units. See, e.g., Elizabeth Goitein & David M. Shapiro, 
Classification and Consequences: Secrecy Should Be Justified, Not Automatic, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUST. (Apr. 16, 2010), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/classification-and-consequences-secrecy-
should-be-justified-not-automatic [https://perma.cc/B62D-88J9] (“Pointless secrets threaten our safety 
by blocking the flow of information within government. . . . As the 9/11 commission warned, excessive 
secrecy stymies information exchange between federal agencies and makes it harder to connect the 
dots.”); see also Elizabeth Goitein & David M. Shapiro, Reducing Overclassification Through 
Accountability, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (2011), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/le 
gacy/Justice/LNS/Brennan_Overclassification_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6F4-YQH3].  
